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  INTRODUCTION   
Neuroscience is changing the law. Between 2007 and 2012, 
the number of judicial opinions mentioning neuroscientific evi-
dence more than doubled.1 Brain imaging is now part of the evi-
dentiary record on “everything from competence to waive Mi-
randa rights, subjective experience of pain in tort cases, custody 
determinations, mens rea defenses for fraud, kidnapping, bur-
glary, and even murder.”2 This evidence can decide the weighti-
est of legal matters. Scans have been used to reveal brain abnor-
malities that could explain past behavior and, hence, be used to 
determine whether a defendant deserves the death penalty.3  
 
†  Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law. Thanks to Peter 
Alces, Samuel Becher, Suneal Bedi, Guyora Binder, Stacey Dogan, Christine 
Haight Farley, Jennifer Hunt, Michael Madison, John Monahan, Lisa Ramsey, 
Mike Schuster, Francis Shen, Ned Snow, Rick Su, and Rebecca Tushnet for 
their valuable feedback. The Article profited from presentations at American 
University’s Washington College of Law, Cardozo School of Law, University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law, and the Schol-
arship Symposium at the International Trademark Association’s Annual Meet-
ing in 2018. Amanda Blum, Erin Goldberg, and Rasha Kolia provided stellar 
research assistance. Copyright © 2018 by Mark Bartholomew. 
 1. Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in U.S. Crim-
inal Law: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485, 486 (2015); see also 
Robbie Gonzalez, How Criminal Courts Are Putting Brains—Not People—
On Trial, WIRED (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.wired.com/story/how-criminal 
-courts-are-putting-brains-not-people-on-trial (“[L]awyers are introducing so-
called neurobiological evidence into court more than ever.”). 
 2. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Func-
tional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1132 (2010). 
 3. Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical 
Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493, 494–99 
(2015) (citing the use of brain scans revealing frontal lobe damage as mitigation 
in a death penalty-eligible case).  
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Not surprisingly, a growing legal literature debates the 
proper role of neuroscientific evidence in the law.4 Criminal law 
scholars argue over not just the admissibility of such evidence, 
but its implications for punishment in the future.5 Yet outside of 
criminal law, analysis of neuroscientific evidence in the court-
room has been lacking.6  
This is surprising given the arena where most of the applied 
research into brain function is taking place. Market research, 
not studies of criminal defendants’ grey matter, is where the 
money is and is the focus of much neuroscientific study. Adver-
tisers already deploy neuroscientific insights into better brand-
ing strategies.7 Blue-chip companies that have used neural 
know-how to design advertising campaigns include Volvo, Hyun-
dai, Campbell’s, and Jack Daniel’s.8 Most large advertising agen-
 
 4. Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating 
the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 352 (2010) (de-
scribing “extraordinary growth in the amount of legal scholarship . . . at the in-
tersection of law and neuroscience”). 
 5. See Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Natural-
ism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1595–96 (2010) (suggesting that neuroscience will 
effect a rejection of free will in legal theory and thereby retributivism); Jane 
Campbell Moriarty, Seeing Voices: Potential Neuroscience Contributions to a Re-
construction of Legal Insanity, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 603–04 (2016) (propos-
ing that neuroscience will further legal understanding of the relationship be-
tween thought and behavior, and moral blameworthiness); Stephen J. Morse, 
Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2545, 2570–75 (2007) (arguing materialism cannot entirely erase moralism); O. 
Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1319–24 (2007) (discussing mitigating neurological evi-
dence in Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
 6. See Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience 2.0, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1043, 
1043 (2016) (“Neurolaw too often focuses only on criminal responsibility.”). 
There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., Harvey L. Fiser & Patrick D. Hopkins, 
Getting Inside the Employee’s Head: Neuroscience, Negligent Employment Lia-
bility, and the Push and Pull for New Technology, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 44 
(2017) (neuroscience and employment law); Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neurosci-
ence, and Creativity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 735 (2013) (neuroscience and copyright 
law); Andrew W. Torrance, Neurobiology and Patenting Thought, 50 IDEA 27 
(2009) (neuroscience and patent law). 
 7. In 2013, global market research spending on neuromarketing hit $330 
million. This number is only expected to increase. BCC Research, Neuromarket-
ing Maturing as Research Firms Seek to Leverage Its Advantages, MAR-
KETWIRED (July 11, 2016), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/ 
neuromarketing-maturing-as-research-firms-seek-leverage-its-advantages 
-reports-bcc-research-2141037.htm. 
 8. Roger Dooley, Neuromarketing: Pseudoscience No More, FORBES (Feb. 
24, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerdooley/2015/02/24/neuromarketing 
-temple/#35b2d33dde94. 
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cies and market research firms now have neuromarketing divi-
sions.9 Thanks to this emphasis on learning about shoppers’ 
minds, our understanding of consumer thought can only improve 
in the years to come. 
What if we could know exactly what consumers are think-
ing? Advertisers have always wanted this information to make 
their commercial pitches more effective. But judges have also 
long been in search of a holy grail of perfect consumer under-
standing. Estimates of consumer thought form the bulk of trade-
mark doctrine. A series of common law rules channel judicial in-
tuition about (1) when potential purchasers are likely to view a 
word or symbol as indicating the source of goods; and (2) when 
these purchasers are likely to be confused by the actions of an-
other party.10 Similarly, a federal statutory cause of action for 
trademark dilution asks courts to intuit when non-confusing 
uses of another party’s trademark somehow blur or tarnish the 
signaling power of that trademark inside consumers’ heads.11  
The problem is that even if judges could somehow root out 
their own biases and cognitive flaws, it is impossible to know ex-
actly what the consumer is thinking. Judges themselves recog-
nize this. In the 1940s, Judge Jerome Frank longed to replace 
the common law’s “shaky kind of guess” as to trademark confu-
sion with something that better reflected actual consumer senti-
ment.12 Judge Richard Posner acknowledged that judges have 
their own “blind spots” when trying to understand consumer be-
havior.13  
 
 9. Hilke Plassmann et al., Consumer Neuroscience: Applications, Chal-
lenges, and Possible Solutions, 52 J. MARKETING RES. 427, 427 (2015).  
 10. See infra Part II.D.  
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). A classic example is the hypothetical case of 
“Buick aspirin.” Under dilution theory, although consumers would not believe 
that the car brand had entered the pain relief business, such an unauthorized 
use might somehow diminish the original source-identifying power of the 
BUICK trademark. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, H.R. REP. NO. 
104–374, at 2–3, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029–30 (offering 
BUICK aspirin, DUPONT shoes, and KODAK pianos as examples of unauthor-
ized uses of famous trademarks that would lead to trademark dilution). 
 12. Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948). 
Frank went so far as to question a group of “adolescent girls and their mothers 
and sisters, persons I have chosen at random” to determine whether actual con-
sumers would confuse plaintiff ’s SEVENTEEN for magazines with defendant’s 
MISS SEVENTEEN for girdles. Frank admitted that “my method of obtaining 
such data is not satisfactory,” but thought it preferable to deciding the issue 
without consulting anyone of the relevant purchasing class: teenage girls. Id. 
 13. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, 
Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (commenting that “judges and jurors have 
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Trademark law scholars sing the same lament, longing for 
more accurate measures of the consuming mind.14 Some contend 
that the rules of thumb for evaluating whether a word or symbol 
should be eligible for trademark protection fail to track con-
sumer thought.15 Others suggest that judges are bad at as-
sessing audience confusion.16 Whatever the source of the prob-
lem, protecting words that do not actually communicate source 
and failing to protect words that do prohibits innocuous trade-
mark uses, thereby harming free expression and competition 
while doing nothing to advance consumer interests. 
For its proponents, consumer neuroscience holds the poten-
tial for replacing flawed judicial intuition with precise measure-
ments of consumer thought.17 Consider a recent study where 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to 
 
their own biases and blind spots” in assessing the likelihood of consumer confu-
sion). 
 14. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, What’s the Harm of Trademark Infringe-
ment?, 49 AKRON L. REV. 627, 646 (2016) (“As long as trademark purports to be 
guided by consumer reactions, it can only benefit from a better understanding 
of those reactions.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Jake Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful?, 105 GEO. L.J. 
731, 734–36 (2017) (examining trademark analysis in light of sound symbolism); 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. 
L. REV. 351, 359–62 (2014) (arguing that trademark distinctiveness doctrine is 
“largely unsuccessful”); Alexandra J. Roberts, How to Do Things with Word 
Marks: A Speech-Act Theory of Distinctiveness, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1039 
(2014) (describing the harm resulting from the failure of distinctiveness tests); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Ad-
vertising Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 871–74 (2011) (criticizing the disconnect 
between legal doctrine and marketing knowledge). 
 16. See Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confu-
sion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1307, 1308–09 (2012) (“[T]rademark owners exploit [the likelihood of 
confusion test’s] uncertainty and the high cost of litigation it generates.”); Mark 
A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 427 
(2010) (criticizing an overinclusive assessment of consumer confusion); see also 
Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property In-
fringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1260 (2014) (noting “systematic ways in 
which the jury’s perspective is likely to diverge from that of actual consumers” 
in trademark infringement cases). 
 17. Moran Cerf et al., Using Single-Neuron Recording in Marketing: Oppor-
tunities, Challenges, and an Application to Fear Enhancement in Communica-
tions, 52 J. MARKETING RES. 530, 534 (2015) (touting consumer neuroscience’s 
future capability for determining brand confusion); Vinod Venkatraman et al., 
New Scanner Data for Brand Marketers: How Neuroscience Can Help Better Un-
derstand Differences in Brand Preferences, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 143, 149 
(2012) (discussing how brain imaging can let advertisers “detect distinct emo-
tional states and their corresponding distinct decision-making processes”). 
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measure changes in brain blood flow and oxygenation while re-
search subjects viewed several well-known trademarks.18 After-
wards, the study’s participants completed a widely-used market 
research survey designed to assess each brand’s personality 
traits.19 On the basis of these two data sets, the researchers 
claimed the ability to decode “the representational space of 
brand personality in the brain,” successfully predicting the brain 
activity of consumers viewing other trademarks like DISNEY or 
GUCCI.20 According to the researchers, each brand has a differ-
ent neural signature, with different brain regions reflecting per-
ceptions like “excitement,” “ruggedness,” or “sophistication” 
upon exposure to the brand stimulus.21 By viewing these neural 
signatures, researchers could distinguish whether the subject 
was thinking about APPLE or MICROSOFT, COKE or PEPSI.22  
Studies like this hint at a future where fMRI readings re-
place judicial guesswork about consumer perception. At some 
point, businesses may try to offer a neural map unique to each 
well-known brand—a “neuromark”—into evidence. This neuro-
mark would reveal not just whether consumers are familiar with 
a trademark, but how they actually feel about it. The neuromark 
promises a biological baseline for the basic questions at the heart 
of trademark law, telling courts how a mark is perceived and 
whether a defendant’s activities will interfere with those percep-
tions. 
This is not to say that neuroscientists currently have the 
ability to peer into consumers’ heads and determine when a 
mark signals source to an audience, or when another party’s use 
of that mark will confuse consumers or alter the mark’s reputa-
tion. The neuromark is an aspirational goal, not a present real-
ity. In an important and prescient article written ten years ago, 
Rebecca Tushnet demonstrated that psychological studies of the 
time did not justify actions for trademark dilution. Tushnet 
showed that these studies were unreliable and offer little evi-
dence of actual harm to famous mark owners.23 “In a complex, 
 
 18. Yu-Ping Chen et al., From “Where” to “What”: Distributed Representa-
tions of Brand Associations in the Human Brain, 52 J. MARKETING RES. 453, 
455 (2015). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 455–56. 
 21. Id. at 457. 
 22. Id. at 460–61. 
 23. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cog-
nitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 527–46 (2008). The key study Tushnet ana-
lyzed, however, did not rely on neural imaging. Instead, after being exposed to 
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dynamic system like that of trademark law,” she cautions, “there 
are no magic bullets, or magic MRIs.”24 
I take Tushnet’s concerns seriously. Researchers have yet to 
refine their techniques such that every brand’s neural signature 
will be unique from all others or to show that the biological blue-
print uncovered during an fMRI scan would look the same dur-
ing exposure to a brand in the real-world marketplace. Never-
theless, for two reasons, the implications of brain science for 
trademark law deserve serious scholarly consideration. 
First, scientific understanding of the brain has increased 
dramatically in the last decade.25 A common early criticism of 
neuroscience was a tendency among researchers to focus on lo-
calized brain functions, ignoring the reality that human thought 
involves complex neural networks spread across the brain.26 To-
day, however, researchers routinely track brain activity across 
many areas.27 As a result, even neuromarketing skeptics 
acknowledge that “[n]euroscience has much to say about such 
major phenomena as attention, emotion, and memory that are 
essential to motivating consumers.”28  
Second, even flawed science can sometimes find its way into 
the courtroom. The history of psychology and law reveals several 
 
supposedly dilutive advertisements, respondents had to hit keys for “yes” or “no” 
to see how quickly they could determine whether a famous brand presented on 
a computer screen matched its correct product category (e.g., Godiva choco-
lates). See Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical 
Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265 (2000) 
(finding existence of trademark dilution through memory-based measures). 
 24. Tushnet, supra note 23, at 568. 
 25. See infra Part I. 
 26. See generally WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS 
OF LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN 4–27 (2001). Neuroscien-
tists also need to be careful not to jump to conclusions or accidentally trumpet 
false positives given the tremendous amount of data collected and analyzed 
through modern brain scanning technology. See generally Craig M. Bennett et 
al., Neural Correlates of Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-Mortem At-
lantic Salmon: An Argument for Multiple Comparisons Correction, 1 J. SEREN-
DIPITOUS & UNEXPECTED RESULTS 1, 1 (2010) (using scans of dead fish that 
supposedly exhibited brain activity when being exposed to photographs of hu-
man subjects to illustrate the need for more correction for chance correlations 
in fMRI research). 
 27. See Martha J. Farah, Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater: Critiquing 
Critiques of Functional Neuroimaging, in INTERPRETING NEUROIMAGES: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS LIMITS S19, S21–S23 (Josephine 
Johnston & Erik Parens eds., 2014) (describing non-localized and non-phreno-
logical methods of neuroimaging analysis).  
 28. SALLY SATEL & SCOTT O. LILIENFELD, BRAINWASHED: THE SEDUCTIVE 
APPEAL OF MINDFULNESS NEUROSCIENCE 34 (2013). 
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instances where supposed advances in the study of the human 
mind proved grossly inaccurate and triggered significant, some-
times deleterious legal consequences.29 The increasing reliance 
on neuroscientific evidence in criminal adjudications suggests 
that courts are already concluding that some brain imaging data 
meets the tests for scientific reliability. Moreover, because neu-
roscience is arguably more suited to supply evidence of general 
consumer sentiment from the aggregation of multiple fMRI 
scans than to accurately pinpoint a single criminal defendant’s 
mental state, trademark law seems a better candidate for the 
introduction of fMRI results than criminal law.30 Hence, even if 
the hype of consumer neuroscience does not currently match the 
reality, critical analysis is needed to prepare courts for attempts 
to introduce neuroscience into evidence in trademark cases. 
This Article begins to provide that analysis. Part I of the Ar-
ticle describes the current state of the art in consumer neurosci-
ence and its relationship to the legal questions of distinctiveness, 
likelihood of confusion, and dilution that dominate trademark 
law. Businesses are bankrolling experiments and technologies 
meant to reveal the essential ingredients of buying behavior. A 
key part of this research searches for the neural hallmarks of 
successful brands. 
Part II is predictive. It describes how the estimates of con-
sumer perception that run through trademark law could be al-
tered by neuroscience. One cannot chart a simple story of scien-
tific advancements automatically updating legal thought. It is 
impossible to forecast with certainty how consumer neuroscience 
will develop in the years to come and how those developments 
will shape trademark law. Nevertheless, antecedent collisions 
between law and psychology offer lessons for how neuroscientific 
understandings could be incorporated into trademark doctrine. 
The recent introduction of neuroscientific evidence in criminal 
 
 29. See Jed S. Rakoff, Neuroscience and the Law: Don’t Rush In, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS (May 12, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/05/12/ 
neuroscience-and-the-law-dont-rush-in. To take one particularly troubling ex-
ample, psychologists provided important professional and academic cover for 
the eugenics movement of the early twentieth century, which in turn influenced 
the legal profession. The Supreme Court’s decision in the 1927 case of Buck v. 
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, not only upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia forced 
sterilization law, but provided legal blessing for a series of eugenics laws in dif-
ferent states that ultimately resulted in the forced sterilization of between sixty 
and seventy thousand people. ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, 
AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK 8–9, 299–300, 
319 (2016); see also infra Part II. 
 30. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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law also suggests likely paths of influence for consumer neuro-
science. 
Part III erects the normative scaffolding to see which of 
these paths policymakers and judges should take and which they 
should avoid. Psychologists recognize two models of consumer 
reasoning: an automatic, emotional model and a deliberative, 
cognitive model.31 Neuroscience offers a window into both pro-
cesses, but courts should be wary of evidence purporting to meas-
ure non-deliberative changes in mark meaning. Accepting neu-
ral proof of shoppers’ emotional reactions into evidence could 
stifle competition and handicap consumers in their efforts to de-
cipher and learn from advertising’s affective appeals. An over-
eager embrace of consumer neuroscience also risks extending le-
gal protection to marketing innovations the law may want to 
discourage. Greater understanding of how consumers think 
changes the rules of the trademark game. It is critical for legis-
lators, judges, and scholars to make sure that they change in the 
right way. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING CONSUMERS   
By uncovering a brand’s neural hallmarks, advertisers can 
better track the mental bonds between trademarks and consum-
ers. This research not only lends itself to more effective advertis-
ing, but also holds the potential for new insights into how human 
beings perceive and make decisions about commercial symbols, 
something at the heart of trademark law. After illustrating the 
centrality of consumer perceptions to trademark law, this Part 
describes neuroscience’s current capabilities in measuring those 
perceptions. 
A. TRADEMARK LAW AND CONSUMER PERCEPTION 
Trademark law revolves around judicial assessments of con-
sumer thought. In almost any trademark case, the central ques-
tion at issue is how consumers are likely to perceive a particular 
advertising stimulus. 
Take, for example, the hypothetical case of a restaurant 
chain named “Burgatory.”32 If the proprietors of this chain seek 
trademark protection, they will need to demonstrate that their 
 
 31. See Shahar Ayal et al., Deliberative Adjustments of Intuitive Anchors: 
The Case of Diversification Behavior, 189 SYNTHESE 131, 133 (2012) (offering a 
study of the interaction between the two modes of reasoning). 
 32. Actually, not so hypothetical. See BURGATORY, http://www 
.burgatorybar.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2018). 
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BURGATORY mark is “distinctive,” i.e., consumers recognize 
the BURGATORY mark as identifying a source of goods or ser-
vices.33 To figure out whether consumers interpret a mark as a 
source identifier, courts employ tests of their own construction, 
such as the “imagination test” (asking if the term at issue re-
quires imagination to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the 
product) or the “double entendre” test (treating marks that em-
ploy twofold meanings as automatically distinctive).34 If the 
mark at issue passes these tests—for example, a court concludes 
that a consumer requires some imagination to discern that the 
BURGATORY mark is for a particular hamburger restaurant 
and, hence, the mark signals source instead of mere product 
characteristics—then the mark is considered “inherently distinc-
tive”35 and enjoys full trademark rights without any proof of ac-
tual consumer sentiment.36  
If a mark fails these tests, however, then the mark propo-
nent must provide evidence of “acquired distinctiveness” in the 
minds of consumers.37 Courts look to circumstantial proof, like 
the amount of advertising conducted by the mark proponent, the 
relevant product’s sales volume, and evidence that the defendant 
knowingly imitated the plaintiff ’s symbol, to determine if a 
mark has acquired distinctiveness.38 The basic question at issue 
in the acquired distinctiveness analysis is whether consumers 
have come to associate the mark at issue with a particular source 
of goods or services. If BURGATORY does not indicate source to 
consumers, it is considered “merely descriptive” and forfeits 
trademark protection.39  
 
 33. Jake Linford, The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive 
Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1375 (2015) (“Trademark law protects the 
exclusive use of a word only to the extent that the word signifies a singular 
source for a product.”). 
 34. Zobmondo Entm’t. v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1115–17 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (applying the imagination test); Zurco, Inc. v. Sloan Valve Co., 785 F. 
Supp. 2d 476, 491 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (applying the double entendre test). 
 35. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992) (defining 
inherently distinctive as “not merely descriptive”). 
 36. The imagination test is the most commonly used method for determin-
ing when a mark is inherently distinctive. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY 
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:67 (5th ed. 2018). 
 37. See Zobmondo, 602 F.3d at 1113 (also referring to acquired distinctive-
ness as “secondary meaning”). 
 38. MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 15:38.  
 39. Similarly, marks deemed “generic” cannot be protected at all, even if 
there is evidence of acquired distinctiveness. Generic terms “depict a genus or 
type of product, rather than a particular product.” Murphy Door Bed Co. v. In-
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If Burgatory’s owners convince a court that they own a dis-
tinctive mark, they can potentially sue others for trademark in-
fringement. Let’s say that the Burgatory folks object to a new 
restaurant that styles itself “Burger Story,” worrying that 
burger purchasers will confuse the new restaurant with their 
own. Again, the court must estimate consumer perception, this 
time asking whether customers will mistake the defendant’s 
trademark for the plaintiff ’s. All of the federal circuit courts of 
appeal rely on a multi-factor test to answer this question. Alt-
hough the number and nature of the factors differ from circuit to 
circuit, there is a consensus that the following factors must be 
part of the consumer confusion analysis: 
 Similarity of the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s marks 
 “Strength” of the plaintiff ’s mark 
 Intent of the defendant 
 Purchaser sophistication 
 Presence of actual confusion 
 Relatedness of the goods or services at issue40 
As these factors make clear, judges assess likelihood of confusion 
through intuition and proxies for consumer sentiment rather 
than actual testing of that sentiment. Only the actual confusion 
factor permits direct evidence of consumer thought to enter the 
analysis—the rest of the infringement analysis is left largely to 
judicial guesswork.41 
Finally, let’s assume that the Burgatory chain enjoys great 
success, opening up restaurants in all fifty states and becoming 
well-known to the general public. Then, without authorization, 
 
terior Sleep Sys., 874 F.2d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 1989). As with the line between in-
herent and acquired distinctiveness, proxies for direct evidence of consumer 
thought—use of the proposed mark by competitors and use by the media—help 
decide whether a mark is “descriptive” and potentially eligible for protection or 
“generic” and not eligible for protection. See, e.g., Mil-Mar Shoe Co. v. Shonac 
Corp., 75 F.3d 1153, 1158–61 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 40. See Michael H. Bierman & Jeffrey D. Wexler, Toward a Reformulation 
of the Test for Determining Trademark Infringement, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 4 
(1990); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 21–23 (Am. 
Law Inst. 1995) (recommending factors to be considered in determining likeli-
hood of confusion). 
 41. The direct nature of actual confusion evidence causes courts to give this 
factor great weight in the likelihood of confusion analysis. See infra notes 164–
65 and accompanying text. Potentially, there could also be direct evidence of 
consumer reaction at issue for the mark strength factor as well. A large part of 
mark strength analysis, however, involves the mark’s “conceptual strength,” 
which is a study of the inherently source-identifying properties of the mark and 
not of any on-the-ground consumer reaction to the mark. See Grayson O Co. v. 
Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 315–16 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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a pet food supplier begins selling a dog food mix under the “Bur-
gatory” name. Even if pet owners are not confused into thinking 
the two companies are related, the restaurant chain may at-
tempt to sue for trademark dilution. A court would need to decide 
whether exposure to the pet food mark will dim the signaling 
power of the BURGATORY mark for hamburger restaurants in 
consumers’ heads. One variety of the dilution cause of action 
asks if the defendant’s use of the mark somehow harms the rep-
utation of the plaintiff ’s mark.42 A court evaluating such a claim 
would need to assess whether consumers are likely to make a 
mental association between the plaintiff ’s and the defendant’s 
marks and whether that association somehow negatively im-
pacts their estimation of the BURGATORY mark. 
As these hypotheticals make clear, judicial estimates of con-
sumer thought dominate trademark law. The problem is that 
these estimates typically lack empirical grounding.43 The trier of 
fact needs to channel the mind of the consuming public with lit-
tle to go on but her own sense of what seems distinctive, confus-
ing, or dilutive. Against this background, it is easy to see the 
appeal of consumer neuroscience for trademark law. It offers the 
potential for replacing hunches and indirect evidence with direct 
neural evidence of consumer perception. 
B. EXPLORING THE CONSUMING MIND 
Thanks to machines that can reveal neural processes as they 
happen, researchers now have a ringside seat to the biological 
mechanisms evident in different kinds of thought processes. 
fMRI scanners record fluctuations in brain blood flow and oxy-
genation, thereby revealing which areas of the brain are acti-
vated by particular stimuli.44 Technologies for detecting the elec-
tric and magnetic fields associated with neural activity in the 
brain—the most important of which is encephalography (EEG)—
have been around for years, but have recently become vastly 
 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2012). 
 43. The lack of empirical or scientific support for trademark law decisions 
has been a frequent and longstanding complaint. See, e.g., William E. Gallagher 
& Ronald C. Goodstein, Inference Versus Speculation in Trademark Infringe-
ment Litigation: Abandoning the Fiction of the Vulcan Mind Meld, 94 TRADE-
MARK REP. 1229, 1269–70 (2004); see also infra notes 118–22. 
 44. fMRI has been identified as “the technique of choice for neuromarket-
ing,” though other, even more precise tools for measuring metabolic brain activ-
ity exist. Terry Daugherty & Ernest Hoffman, Neuromarketing: Understanding 
the Application of Neuroscientific Methods Within Marketing Research, in ETH-
ICS AND NEUROMARKETING 5, 10 (Andrew R. Thomas et al. eds., 2017). 
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more valuable thanks to greater processing speeds that can 
measure the rapid neural changes that mark cognitive and emo-
tional response.45 These processing speeds allow researchers to 
compare shifts in neurological function mere milliseconds 
apart.46 This technology has also become more portable, with 
wearable EEG devices that soldiers can take on the battlefield47 
and consumers can don while they shop.48 
Consumer neuroscience uses these technologies to study 
“the neural conditions and processes that underlie consumption, 
their psychological meaning, and their behavioral conse-
quences.”49 From the advertiser’s perspective, reliance on neuro-
physiological data avoids the problems inherent in consumer 
self-reporting. For a long time, researchers have developed 
 
 45. Relatedly, the technologies for determining biometric responses to ex-
ternal stimuli have gotten more sophisticated and, as a result, valuable to mar-
ket researchers. Measurements of heart rate, breathing, and skin conductance 
have been used to determine audience arousal and attention. Cameras that 
track participants’ gaze and pupil dilation can also be used to gauge onlookers’ 
engagement and processing of ads. See Uma R. Karmarkar & Carolyn Yoon, 
Consumer Neuroscience: Advances in Understanding Consumer Psychology, 10 
CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 160, 163 (2016); Neal Ungerleider, Eyetracking 
and the Neuroscience of Good Web Design, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 17, 2013), http:// 
fastcompany.com/3019886/eyetracking-and-the-neuroscience-of-good-web 
-design. These indirect measures of thought can be compared with the more di-
rect measures represented by EEG and fMRI readings to help confirm or dis-
prove findings. Daugherty & Hoffman, supra note 44, at 6–7. 
 46. See Karmarkar & Yoon, supra note 45, at 163. 
 47. Srivari Aishwarya, US Army Researchers Study Neuroscience to Predict 
Soldier Activity, ARMY TECH. (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.army-technology.com/ 
uncategorised/newsus-army-researchers-study-neuroscience-to-predict-solider 
-activity-4969662. 
 48. Dinushi Dias, How Consumer Neuroscience Is Transforming How We 
Shop, SMARTCOMPANY (Apr. 20, 2016), http://smartcompany.com.au/industries/ 
retail/how-consumer-neuroscience-is-transforming-how-we-shop; see also Shen, 
supra note 6, at 1057–59 (describing series of mobile, “[c]onsumer-friendly” 
brain stimulation devices). One limitation on EEG research is that it lacks the 
spatial resolution of fMRI imaging, which can make it difficult to identify the 
particular brain structures at play. But researchers are not limited to one 
method of brain imaging or the other. By combining fMRI and EEG measure-
ments, neuroscientists can achieve maximal temporal and spatial definition in 
their studies. Stefan Debener et al., Single-Trial EEG-fMRI Reveals the Dynam-
ics of Cognitive Function, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 558, 558 (2006).  
 49. Martin Reimann et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Con-
sumer Research: A Review and Application, 28 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 608, 
610 (2011). One can draw a distinction between “consumer neuroscience” and 
“neuromarketing.” Consumer neuroscience involves research into brain struc-
ture and function as they relate to buying decisions. Neuromarketing specifi-
cally applies this research to produce desired commercial outcomes. Both are 
relevant to this Article to the extent they reveal newfound abilities to under-
stand and measure consumer thought. 
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branding strategies based on responses provided through con-
sumer surveys and focus groups. The problem is that shoppers 
do not always tell the truth. Sometimes they misreport because 
they do not want to convey something embarrassing or taboo to 
their interlocutors. At other times, they simply cannot articulate 
or recognize their own thoughts in relation to an advertising or 
product stimulus.50 Some high-profile product introductions, like 
“New Coke” in the 1980s, were rigorously vetted by sample con-
sumers before their public rollout. Yet they still flopped. Sur-
veyed consumers told market researchers what they wanted to 
hear instead of sharing their true feelings about the product.51 
Neuroscientific methods of gauging consumer thought help 
avoid the problem of consumers who don’t know or don’t want to 
reveal what is going on in their heads. The number of firms spe-
cializing in neuromarketing is growing as businesses plow re-
sources into this new kind of market research that avoids some 
of the traditional problems with consumer self-reporting.52 As 
the technology advances, neuroscientists are probing the main 
 
 50. Celine Solnais et al., The Contribution of Neuroscience to Consumer Re-
search: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Review, 36 J. ECON. PSYCH. 68, 
69 (2013). 
 51. HENRY PETROSKI, SUCCESS THROUGH FAILURE 79 (2018) (Coca-Cola’s 
president and chief operating officer lamented that his company’s market re-
search did not “measure or reveal the depth and abiding emotional attachment” 
of a significant group of consumers to the original Coke); Robert M. Schindler, 
The Real Lesson of New Coke: The Value of Focus Groups for Predicting the Ef-
fects of Social Influence, 4 MARKETING RES. 22, 22–27 (1992) (maintaining that 
survey respondents did not accurately anticipate how negative reactions from 
others would reshape their own feelings about changes to the Coke formula). 
 52. A study published in 2010 could identify only sixteen companies offer-
ing neuromarketing services. Carl Erik Fisher et al., Defining Neuromarketing: 
Practices and Professional Challenges, 18 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 230, 232 
(2010). That number had grown to more than sixty by 2012. Ale Smidts et al., 
Advancing Consumer Neuroscience, 25 MARKETING LETTERS 257, 260 (2014). 
Today, the Neuromarketing Science & Business Association website lists over 
120 companies specializing in consumer neuroscience. “Neuromarketing Com-
panies,” NEUROMARKETING SCI. & BUS. ASS’N, http://www.nmsba.com/ 
neuromarketing-companies (last visited Sept. 17, 2018). Another measure of the 
growing interest in neuromarketing comes from patent filings. Fewer than 400 
so-called “neuro-technology” patent applications had been filed each year in the 
period from 2000 to 2009. That number had quadrupled to 1600 in 2014. Over 
100 of these came from the market research firm Nielsen. First-ever Pervasive 
Neurotechnology Report Finds 10,000+ Patent Filings Transforming Medicine, 
Entertainment and Business, SHARPBRAINS (May 6, 2015), https://sharpbrains 
.com/blog/2015/05/06/first-ever-pervasive-neurotechnology-report-finds-10000 
-patent-filings-transforming-medicine-entertainment-and-business; Surge in 
US “Brain-reading” Patents, BBC NEWS (May 7, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/technology-32623063.  
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drivers of successful branding. Most important for courts decid-
ing trademark disputes, these researchers are attempting to pin-
point the neural signs of trademark familiarity, comparison, and 
meaning. 
1. Brand Familiarity 
A central point of emphasis for neuromarketing is branding. 
Neuroscience cemented its unique ability to measure brand eq-
uity in a 2004 study. Test subjects took sips of Coke and Pepsi 
while their heads were in an fMRI scanner.53 At first, the sipped 
brand remained hidden and subjects were simply asked to rate 
each cola’s taste.54 Participants expressed a slight taste prefer-
ence for Pepsi.55 Meanwhile, the scanner revealed a heightened 
response in a region of the brain that mediates pleasure and re-
ward when the subjects drank Pepsi, thus matching the verbal-
ized taste preference.56 Next, the subjects did the same thing, 
but this time saw the brand name of the beverage before they 
took their sips.57 Seeing the brand name not only triggered a 
switch in verbal preference, most participants now said they fa-
vored the taste of Coke, but also in neural activity.58 Notifying 
subjects that they were drinking Coke prompted stronger neural 
responses in subjects than notifying them that they were drink-
ing Pepsi.59 The study proved that successful branding not only 
changes our reported enjoyment of a product, but it can actually 
change consumer brain chemistry, and this change can be meas-
ured.60 
Since 2004, researchers have built on the Coke study’s find-
ings to develop more precise measurements of brand influence in 
consumers’ minds. A great deal of applied research involves fig-
 
 53. Samuel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference 
for Culturally Familiar Drinks, 44 NEURON 379, 380 (2004). 
 54. Id. at 381. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 382. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 382–83. 
 59. Id. at 383. 
 60. Id. at 379. Aspects of McClure’s study have been replicated by other 
researchers. See Michael Koenigs & Daniel Tranel, Prefrontal Cortex Damage 
Abolishes Brand-Cued Changes in Cola Preference, 3 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFEC-
TIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1 (2008). 
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uring out how consumers perceive and retrieve memories of dif-
ferent brands.61 fMRI and EEG readings can assess how success-
ful an advertiser has been in planting brand impressions in our 
minds. When a consumer is exposed to a strong brand like Coke, 
fMRI scanners detect activity in parts of the brain associated 
with value encoding and familiarity.62 Research already reveals 
differences in the firing rates of neurons in the two regions of the 
brain—the hippocampus and the amygdala—based on whether 
images are being viewed for the first time or have been seen be-
fore.63 “With great specificity and sensitivity, researchers can, on 
the basis of brain data, determine whether lab subjects have or 
have not seen particular sets of words and images.”64 
Hence, consumer neuroscience offers the possibility of meas-
uring how deeply a brand is etched into audience memories, in-
formation central to trademark law’s acquired distinctiveness 
analysis.65 According to the neuroscientists doing this work, 
brain imaging now “provides a direct measure of the strength of 
encoding during the ad.”66 Current analyses of acquired distinc-
tiveness rely on circumstantial evidence—like sales volume and 
advertising expenditures—to determine the public’s familiarity 
with a mark. Neural imaging would seem to offer more direct 
 
 61. See, e.g., PHIL BARDEN, DECODED: THE SCIENCE BEHIND WHY WE BUY 
84, 117 (2013); DOUGLAS VAN PRAET, UNCONSCIOUS BRANDING: HOW NEURO-
SCIENCE CAN EMPOWER (AND INSPIRE) MARKETING 81–82 (2012); Priyali Ra-
jagopal & Nicole Votolato Montgomery, I Imagine, I Experience, I Like: The 
False Experience Effect, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 578, 579 (2011). 
 62. See, e.g., Franz-Rudolf Esch et al., Brands on the Brain: Do Consumers 
Use Declarative Information or Experienced Emotions to Evaluate Brands?, 22 
J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 75, 76 (2012); José Paulo Santos et al., Neuroscience in 
Branding: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study on Brands’ Implicit 
and Explicit Impressions, 19 J. BRAND MGMT. 735, 735–36 (2012); see also Jesse 
Rissman et al., Decoding fMRI Signatures of Real-World Autobiographical 
Memory Retrieval, 28 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 604, 616 (2016) (finding 
that it is possible to decode from brain activity with a high degree of certainty 
whether a person recognizes a face or life-event as previously encountered or 
instead perceives it as novel). 
 63. Cerf et al., supra note 17, at 534. 
 64. Shen, supra note 6, at 1065. 
 65. Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 2020, 2032 (2005) (citation omitted) (“Trademark law, and the marketing 
literature with it, has long recognized that the more distinctive a trademark is 
from other marks, the greater is consumers’ ‘awareness’ of it and the more im-
mediately ‘accessible’ it is in their memory.”).  
 66. Vinod Venkatraman et al., Predicting Advertising Success Beyond Tra-
ditional Measures: New Insights from Neurophysiological Methods and Market 
Response Modeling, 52 J. MARKETING RES. 436, 440 (2015). 
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and persuasive evidence of the public’s recognition of a trade-
mark.  
It is less likely that consumer neuroscience can shed light 
on the analysis of inherent distinctiveness. While assessing 
whether consumers have a memory of a particular commercial 
stimulus seems firmly within the neuroscientists’ grasp, the 
mental processes at work in determining whether a trademark 
inherently indicates the source of goods are more complicated.67 
Still, the hope would be that as researchers become more skilled 
at identifying neural correlates for specific mental states,68 at 
some point, it will be possible to determine if a consumer inter-
prets an unfamiliar mark as a source identifier or merely as a 
product descriptor. Such direct evidence of consumer perception 
might be considered more probative than judicial rules of thumb 
like the imagination and double entendre tests. 
2. Confusion and Consumer Choice 
Other consumer neuroscience research analyzes the ways 
consumers make choices. Consumer decision making typically 
requires a decision between shopping options: Should I buy 
Toothpaste A or Toothpaste B? Particular regions of the brain 
show different levels of activation depending on how the con-
sumer is comparing brands. The brain’s ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex processes the emotions involved when deciding between 
two trademarks.69 One study demonstrates that this area of the 
brain exhibits different levels of activation when consumers 
evaluate advertising geared to brand usefulness as opposed to 
 
 67. See infra Part II.B. 
 68. See, e.g., Anna Beyeler et al., Divergent Routing of Positive and Negative 
Information from the Amygdala During Memory Retrieval, 90 NEURON 348 
(2016) (identifying particular populations of neurons that “incorrectly” respond 
to positive stimuli in the brains of depressed subjects); Gillian A. Matthews et 
al., Dorsal Raphe Dopamine Neurons Represent the Experience of Social Isola-
tion, 164 CELL 617, 617–18 (2016) (linking a specific cellular substrate to the 
experience of loneliness); Iris Vilares et al., Predicting the Knowledge-Reckless-
ness Distinction in the Human Brain, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3222, 3222 
(2017) (using brain imaging to predict whether the subject was in a “knowing” 
or “reckless” mental state). Even fleeting emotions, like contentment or sur-
prise, can be discerned via fMRI scans. Philip A. Kragel et al., Decoding Spon-
taneous Emotional States in the Human Brain, 14 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2016).  
 69. Sam O. Al-Kwifi, The Role of fMRI in Detecting Attitude Toward Brand 
Switching: An Exploratory Study Using High Technology Products, 25 J. PROD-
UCT & BRAND MGMT. 208, 208 (2016). 
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brand pleasure.70 Strong brands prompt consumers to empha-
size short-term benefits over long-term gains,71 and different 
shopping contexts can cause brands to have more or less im-
portance to our buying decisions.72 One can see how these in-
sights could be useful not just from the perspective of advertising 
effectiveness, but from a legal perspective. If certain environ-
mental factors cause consumers to be less thoughtful or, in the 
parlance of trademark law, less sophisticated, their presence 
should make confusion more likely.  
Researchers also tout “the potential to detect brand confu-
sion” from studying the activity of a single neuron known to re-
spond in a particular way to a particular brand stimulus.73 The 
idea seems to be that if Coke has a unique neural signature and 
a rival usage (e.g., “Koke”) triggers that same neural signature 
in consumers’ brains, that could be compelling evidence of con-
sumer confusion. If a unique neuromark can be defined for a 
well-known brand, then an interloper whose mark triggers the 
same neural associations in consumers’ heads may be accused of 
infringement.  
Admittedly, there is a distinction between recognizing the 
plaintiff ’s trademark when viewing the defendant’s mark and 
being confused into thinking that the defendant’s mark is the 
plaintiff ’s mark. Hence, trademark confusion could not be con-
clusively demonstrated by showing that consumers exhibited the 
same neural signature when viewing the defendant’s mark as 
when they viewed the plaintiff ’s mark. At the least, however, 
evidence of this kind of recognition would be suggestive of confu-
sion. After all, the current likelihood of confusion test considers 
mark similarity to be extremely probative of confusion.74 In a 
 
 70. Id. at 212–13. 
 71. This is true even for decisions unrelated to the brand. Carsten Mu-
rawski et al., Led into Temptation? Rewarding Brand Logos Bias the Neural 
Encoding of Incidental Economic Decisions, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 5–6 (2012). Other 
studies show a concomitant lessening of reflective thinking when subjects rec-
ognize one of their favorite trademarks. Martin Reimann et al., Novel Versus 
Familiar Brands: An Analysis of Neurophysiology, Response Latency, and 
Choice, 23 MARKETING LETTERS 745, 753–56 (2012). 
 72. See Hilke Plassmann, What Can Advertisers Learn from Neuroscience?, 
26 INT’L J. ADVERT. 151, 162–63 (2007) (discussing studies showing that shop-
ping situations that put consumers under time constraints or offer little tangi-
ble information cause greater reliance on and higher consumer valuation of 
well-known trademarks). 
 73. Cerf et al., supra note 17, at 534. 
 74. See A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 
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sense, the ability to compare brands’ neural signatures would of-
fer a richer, more detailed portrait of mark similarity, one that 
substitutes direct evidence of consumer perception for judicial 
guesswork. 
3. Brand Meaning 
Finally, scientists seek to neurologically test not just brand 
familiarity, but brand meaning. Even strong brands differ in the 
meanings they encode in consumers’ memories. A key component 
of brand meaning is the ability to make a trademark serve as a 
signifier of status within the consumer’s social group. Neuromar-
keters diagnose certain areas of the brain that show increased 
activity when a brand successfully signals status to a con-
sumer.75 Brain activity can also indicate when a brand is cultur-
ally familiar to a particular demographic. For example, when 
German test subjects were presented with different luxury car 
logos (e.g., BMW vs. Acura), a particular region of the prefrontal 
cortex was activated only by the culturally familiar logos.76 Neu-
roscience studies also reveal that exposure to brands with repu-
tations for style or creativity causes consumers to behave more 
impulsively.77 
There are efforts underway to identify neural traits for cat-
egories even more specific than “status brands,” “culturally fa-
miliar brands,” or “creative brands.” As described by one group 
of consumer neuroscientists, the research is now at the stage 
where “the brands a consumer is thinking about can be reliably 
predicted from patterns of neural activations.”78 Just by showing 
 
198, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The single most important factor in determining like-
lihood of confusion is mark similarity.”).  
 75. VAN PRAET, supra note 61, at 44–47; Christopher N. Cascio et al., Neu-
ral Correlates of Susceptibility to Group Opinions in Online Word-of-Mouth Rec-
ommendations, 52 J. MARKETING RES. 559, 560 (2015); Michael Schaefer & Mi-
chael Rotte, Thinking on Luxury or Pragmatic Brand Products: Brain Responses 
to Different Categories of Culturally Based Brands, 1165 BRAIN RES. 98, 101–02 
(2007). 
 76. Michael Schaefer et al., Neural Correlates of Culturally Familiar 
Brands of Car Manufacturers, 31 NEUROIMAGE 861, 863–64 (2006). 
 77. See Murawski et al., supra note 71, at 5–6 (describing how exposure to 
the Apple logo was associated with activation of the brain’s reward system and 
“immediately available reward alternatives” were assigned a higher relative 
value). 
 78. Colin Camerer & Carolyn Yoon, Introduction to the Journal of Market-
ing Research Special Issue on Neuroscience and Marketing, 52 J. MARKETING 
RES. 423, 424 (2015). 
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consumers brand names and looking at the resulting fMRI meas-
urements, these researchers were able to tell whether the con-
sumer was thinking about Louis Vuitton or Coca-Cola, IBM or 
Google.79 Patterns of brain activity can even be translated into 
brand personality traits, revealing that consumers think of 
Campbell’s Soup as “sincere,” Ford as “rugged,” and Mercedes-
Benz as “sophisticated.”80 Neuromarks promise to reveal not just 
the degree of consumer recognition of a trademark, but how con-
sumers feel about and understand the brand at issue. 
Assessments of brand meaning bear on actions for trade-
mark dilution that require courts to determine whether a de-
fendant’s non-confusing use of a similar mark “harms the repu-
tation” of the plaintiff ’s mark.81 To date, the difficulty in 
determining whether an association will develop in the con-
sumer’s head after witnessing the defendant’s unauthorized use 
of a famous mark has limited the viability of the dilution cause 
of action.82 Also difficult is assessing the reputational effects of 
such an association.83 Better insights into brand meaning could 
change this. If a perceived brand meaning can be determined 
through neural scans, then it seems plausible that changes to 
that meaning in response to the defendant’s mark can be as-
sessed as well.84  
4. Limitations and Concerns 
Some final words of caution are appropriate when consider-
ing consumer neuroscience’s potential. fMRI and EEG results 
undoubtedly reveal a wealth of information about consumer 
thought that was not available just a few years ago. At the same 
time, the meaning of this information is not always apparent. 
There is a certain amount of subjectivity inherent in the reading 
of brain scans; it is not always clear how an influx of blood or 
 
 79. Chen et al., supra note 18, at 455–58.  
 80. Id. app. at 14 fig.S3. Other studies complement these neuroscientific 
assessments of brand personality by looking for response latencies when brands 
are paired with positive and negative words. See, e.g., Claudiu V. Dimofte, Im-
plicit Measures of Consumer Cognition: A Review, 27 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 
921, 925–28 (2010). 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2012). 
 82. See infra notes 177–78. 
 83. See infra notes 181–84. 
 84. See Chen et al., supra note 18, at 464 (“[F]uture studies extending our 
approach could begin to quantify the extent to which marketing actions affect 
consumers’ mental representations of brand personality.”). 
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electrical impulses to a particular neural territory should be in-
terpreted. The consumer memories and emotions that translate 
into brand distinctiveness and brand meaning involve complex 
processes occurring across the entire brain, not just one neural 
area. While it is fairly clear that particular emotional responses 
(e.g., pain, fear, happiness) activate different regions in the 
brain, it is not so clear that when one of these regions is acti-
vated, a researcher can infer that a particular emotional state 
has been reached. This means that consumer neuroscientists 
have work to do before they can claim evidence of one legally-
significant mental state like confusion versus another like mere 
recognition.  
Another objection might be to the ability of the neuromark 
to identify an empirically sound baseline for consumer percep-
tion of a particular brand. Neuroscientists would need to hone 
their imaging capabilities so that two rivals with a reputation 
for “ruggedness” (think truck sellers Dodge and Ford) could be 
distinguished from each other. There is also the problem of a 
brand’s meaning evolving over time, both intentionally and un-
intentionally. Strategic decisions to change selling strategies, 
e.g., moving from a luxury brand model to more of a low price 
model, would undoubtedly change consumer perceptions and 
thereby alter the neuromark of the brand at issue. Even choosing 
to extend a brand into different territories, say from packaged 
foods to housewares, could modify a mark’s neural signature. 
The Pierre Cardin trademark once had a reputation for glamour, 
but rampant licensing of the name on everything from frying 
pans to sardines reshaped consumer associations.85 Somewhat 
similarly, ENRON meant one thing to consumers in 2000; it 
meant something far different after the company’s bankruptcy 
and fraudulent accounting scandal in 2001. If neuromarks are 
inherently unstable, one might question their value as a tool for 
detecting changes in mark reputation and assessing consumer 
confusion. 
Both of these concerns deserve weight in evaluating the cur-
rent probative value of neuroscientific evidence for trademark 
law. But it is also important to realize that neuroscientists are 
 
 85. Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 809, 821 (2010); cf. Amanda Lauren, 10 Luxury Brands No One 
Wants Anymore, THE RICHEST (July 13, 2014), https://www.therichest.com/ 
expensive-lifestyle/fashion/10-luxury-brands-no-one-wants-anymore (discuss-
ing ten brands that consumers no longer want because of changes to their rep-
utation). 
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aware of these criticisms and are taking them into account. Re-
searchers are becoming more adept at discerning multiregional 
brain activity that describes a unique cognitive condition. For 
example, a recent study employing such an approach was able to 
predict with a high degree of accuracy whether subjects were in 
a “knowing” mental state versus a “reckless” one—categories 
that are often criticized for being hard to differentiate yet trig-
gering dramatically different punishments under criminal law.86 
By examining a variety of brain regions at once, consumer neu-
roscientists can already pinpoint differences in neural signa-
tures among closely-related brands like Coke and Pepsi and Ap-
ple and Microsoft. As the technology and understanding of the 
brain advances, the ability to make fine-grained distinctions be-
tween consumer perceptions of a mark’s attributes should im-
prove.  
Admittedly, brand meanings change, which means the tim-
ing of when a neural snapshot is taken and submitted into evi-
dence in a trademark case will be critical. But this is an issue 
that trademark law already has to negotiate. Courts accept sur-
vey evidence predating the defendant’s allegedly infringing use, 
reasoning that such evidence can be relevant while also consid-
ering timing in determining the survey’s ultimate probativity.87 
A plaintiff that tried to offer evidence of changes to its neuro-
mark based on the defendant’s activity would lose credibility if 
its neural evidence of the brand’s baseline reputation was years 
out of date. In addition, defendants would be free to refute such 
stale evidence by conducting their own, more up-to-date neural 
imaging tests. 
One other concern frequently posited in discussions of crim-
inal law and neuroscience deserves mention. Most neuroscien-
tific research involves the aggregation of many brain scans, not 
the neural analysis of a single person. As a result, neuroscience 
can often offer information on general propensities, but not ab-
solute indications of legally-relevant mental characteristics for a 
specific individual, like a criminal defendant.88  
 
 86. Vilares et al., supra note 68, at 3222. 
 87. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 419 (6th 
Cir. 2006). 
 88. Arielle R. Baskin-Sommers & Karelle Fonteneau, Correctional Change 
Through Neuroscience, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 424 (2016); see also David L. 
Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testi-
mony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 419–20, 472–78 (2014) (offering best practices for 
translating scientific research as to group practices into legal decisions about 
individuals). 
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Trademark law’s focus on consumer perception does, how-
ever, rely on information about aggregate consumer propensities 
to determine whether or not a trademark is protectable or in-
fringement has taken place.89 It is the mental state of an entire 
purchasing population that matters.90 In this way, neuroscience 
has greater potential applicability to trademark law than other 
legal subject areas that hinge on the mental state of one individ-
ual.91  
Finally, even if some of these concerns cast doubt on the cur-
rent reliability and precision of consumer neuroscience, it is still 
important to lay the analytical groundwork for brain imaging’s 
relationship to trademark law. At times, courts embrace scien-
tific evidence that turns out to have limited empirical validity. 
The questionable use of latent fingerprints to identify criminal 
suspects is a good example.92 One might also point to earlier 
movements in law and brain science, like the use of phrenology 
to determine insanity and propensities for dangerousness.93 
 
 89. Moreover, aggregated evidence of confusion or acquired distinctiveness 
need not reflect the majority of prospective purchasers. Survey results demon-
strating confusion in less than twenty percent of the relevant population is con-
sidered probative of likelihood of confusion. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, 
§ 32:185. To prove acquired distinctiveness, a showing that only fifty percent of 
respondents associate the mark at issue with a particular source of goods is 
generally sufficient. Id. § 32:190.  
 90. Many trademark law issues involve assessing the national consuming 
public’s perception of the trademarks at issue. For example, an action for trade-
mark dilution requires the trademark holder to establish that its trademark is 
“widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). For other issues of trademark law, consumer per-
ception in only a limited territory is relevant. E.g., Tex. Tech. Univ. v. Spiegel-
berg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 524 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (assessing whether a uni-
versity’s color scheme was distinctive “[i]n the area around Texas Tech”). 
Regardless, in contrast to criminal law, judges and juries in trademark cases 
must determine the mental state of large aggregate groups of consumers, not of 
single individuals. 
 91. Although some may question how generalizable neuroscience findings 
about brand perceptions are, neuroscientific tests that involve a sample size of 
only a handful of people have produced findings applicable to large populations. 
Emily B. Falk et al., From Neural Responses to Population Behavior: Neural 
Focus Group Predicts Population-Level Media Effects, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 439, 
444 (2012) (explaining that “behavioral responses of entire populations whose 
brains are never examined may be inferred from the brain activations of a small 
neural focus group”); Karmarkar & Yoon, supra note 45, at 161.  
 92. Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint 
“Science” Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 607 (2002) (contending that the 
“science” of fingerprint evidence is “an unfounded creation of law enforcement 
fingerprint examiners”). 
 93. See Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neurosci-
ence in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 191–95 (2009). 
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Multiple studies demonstrate the persuasive force of modern 
brain imaging data, even if that persuasive force is sometimes 
unwarranted.94 Meanwhile, consumer neuroscientists claim to 
be closing in on some of the questions central to trademark law. 
Researchers may not yet be able to pinpoint exactly what a mind 
looks like that is confused or that recognizes a brand as indicat-
ing the source of a product. But they contend that they are get-
ting closer, and trademark law needs to think about how it 
should react once they get there.95 
II.  NEUROSCIENCE’S LIKELY PATH IN TRADEMARK 
CASES   
How will trademark law actually respond to a changing sci-
entific understanding of the consuming mind? This Part tries to 
answer that question by examining historical precedent. Most 
discussions of “neurolaw” lack a historical perspective.96 The his-
 
 94. See, e.g., Diego Fernandez-Duque et al., Superfluous Neuroscience In-
formation Makes Explanations of Psychological Phenomena More Appealing, 27 
J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 926, 926 (2015) (describing how “superfluous neu-
roscience information increased the judged quality of the argument for both 
good and bad explanations”); David P. McCabe et al., The Influence of fMRI Lie 
Detection Evidence on Juror Decision-Making, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 566, 566 
(2011) (“Results showed that fMRI lie detection evidence led to more guilty ver-
dicts than lie detection evidence based on polygraph evidence, thermal facial 
imaging, or a control condition that did not include lie detection evidence. How-
ever, when the validity of the fMRI lie detection evidence was called into ques-
tion on cross-examination, guilty verdicts were reduced to the level of the con-
trol condition.”). 
 95. Some of the examples of applied neuroscientific study described in this 
Part could potentially be illegal when executed in the marketplace instead of 
part of an academic experiment. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could 
impose penalties on neuromarketing techniques deemed “unfair” or “deceptive.” 
Implanting brand memories in consumers without their awareness might run 
afoul of various consumer protection statutes. In other work, I make the case 
that legal authorities need to monitor and regulate the use of this research 
against consumers. See MARK BARTHOLOMEW, ADCREEP: THE CASE AGAINST 
MODERN MARKETING 117–22 (2017) (arguing that regulators such as the FTC 
and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) should more heavily scrutinize neuro-
marketing). Whether and how advertisers should be prevented from operation-
alizing their new neural understandings is not the focus of this Article, however. 
Instead, the Article asks what courts are likely to do and what they should do 
with evidence that offers a better understanding of the consumer mind. 
 96. Psychologist and science historian Fernando Vidal traces an “ahistori-
cal triumphalism characteristic of the neuro field.” Fernando Vidal, Brainhood, 
Anthropological Figure of Modernity, 22 HIST. HUM. SCI. 5, 10 (2009); see also 
Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked History of Neurolaw, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 667, 
667–68 (2016). 
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tory of law and psychology in general and the interaction be-
tween neuroscience and criminal law in particular both suggest 
that brain imaging is unlikely to work a complete overhaul of 
trademark law. Instead, as with the introduction of confusion 
surveys administered by psychologists in the early twentieth 
century, consumer neuroscience will produce limited yet signifi-
cant changes in evidence and doctrine in trademark cases.97 This 
Part is predictive, not normative. Part III interrogates whether 
these predicted changes will lead to better or worse outcomes in 
trademark cases.  
A. THE EXAMPLE OF CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 
Nowhere has there been more anticipation of a neurolaw 
revolution than in the field of criminal law. There are certainly 
skeptics,98 but many scholars tout brain science as replacing “the 
law’s guesswork about the ways in which certain mental condi-
tions might impact criminal responsibility.”99 Brain imaging is 
already part of the evidentiary record for all manner of criminal 
cases.100 Yet some predicted that neuroscience would serve not 
just as an evidentiary supplement but as a force for radical 
change, reshaping the essential doctrines and theories animat-
ing criminal law. Most famously, in 2004, Joshua Greene and 
 
 97. There is no particular standard for evaluating expert testimony involv-
ing social science; instead, the same general gatekeeping rules apply for both 
scientific and non-scientific expert testimony. Maxine D. Goodman, A Hedgehog 
on the Witness Stand—What’s the Big Idea?: The Challenges of Using Daubert 
to Assess Social Science and Nonscientific Testimony, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 
641–42 (2010). Hence, whether one categorizes consumer neuroscience evidence 
as hard science or soft science, the general judicial method of interrogating its 
admissibility is the same. See id. 
 98. See Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 
807, 807–09 (2014) (arguing that there will not be a neurolaw “revolution” that 
radically changes beliefs on criminal responsibility); Stephen J. Morse, Crimi-
nal Law and Common Sense: An Essay on the Perils and Promise of Neurosci-
ence, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 39, 42 (2015) (claiming that “our commonsense under-
standing of agency and responsibility and the legitimacy of criminal justice 
generally are not imperiled by contemporary discoveries in the various sciences, 
including neuroscience and genetics”). 
 99. Vilares et al., supra note 68, at 3227; see also Richard E. Redding, The 
Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-
First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 56 (2006) (contending that we are “closer to 
realizing the early criminologist’s dream of identifying the biological roots of 
criminality”). 
 100. Brown & Murphy, supra note 2, at 1132; Farahany, supra note 1, at 
488–89; see also Denno, supra note 3, at 494–99 (showing that neuroscientific 
evidence is being used to mitigate sentencing in murder cases). 
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Jonathan Cohen contended that neuroscience will “have a trans-
formative effect on the law . . . by transforming people’s moral 
intuitions about free will and responsibility.”101 According to 
Greene and Cohen, neuroscience will cause us to be more sym-
pathetic to others as products of biological determinism, forcing 
legal actors to analyze human behavior less in retributivist, Old 
Testament terms and more in terms of actual social conse-
quences.102 Along these lines, a growing literature debates neu-
roscience’s revolutionary implications for the future of punish-
ment.103  
Contrary to Greene and Cohen’s prediction, however, there 
has been no criminal law neurorevolution. Neuroscientific evi-
dence is being admitted in criminal cases, but the record does 
not reveal fMRI readings prompting a shift in judicial focus from 
individual blame to group consequences.104 To the contrary, neu-
roscience has become an important evidentiary resource for pros-
ecutors arguing for individual culpability. Neural images show-
ing the absence of organic brain damage are used to refute 
defendants’ mitigation claims at sentencing.105 Judges some-
times even seize on seemingly unrelated neuroscientific evidence 
to presume a defendant’s level of intentionality in favor of the 
prosecution. As Deborah Denno recounts, courts interpret neural 
evidence of a victim suffering from shaken baby syndrome not 
just as proof of injury but as evidence of the defendant’s culpable 
mental state.106 At best, neuroscience’s use in the courtroom has 
been a mixed bag for anti-retributivist criminal law scholars. It 
has become a part of criminal law while failing to change its fun-
damental doctrinal frameworks and fixation on individual re-
sponsibility.107 
 
 101. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes 
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B. 
1775, 1775 (2004). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Allan McCay & Jeanette Ken-
nett, My Brain Made Me Do It: Will Neuroscience Change the Way We Punish 
Criminals?, CONVERSATION (May 25, 2016), https://theconversation.com/my 
-brain-made-me-do-it-will-neuroscience-change-the-way-we-punish-criminals 
-57571. 
 104. Kolber, supra note 98, at 814–15. 
 105. Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar: Neuroimaging 
Evidence in the Criminal Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 577, 654 (2016). 
 106. Deborah W. Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323, 323 
(2017). 
 107. Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United 
States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 354, 361 
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Why hasn’t neuroscience triggered greater legal change in 
criminal law? Even before criminal defendants sought to intro-
duce fMRI readings into evidence, behavioral studies demon-
strated that human beings are influenced by their environment 
to a greater extent than most realize.108 Forces that we are una-
ware of poke and prompt us into action. The psychologist’s situ-
ationist view of human behavior clashes with the dispositionist 
underpinnings of the American legal system.109 The legal con-
cepts of causation, responsibility, and blame rely on a default 
understanding of human behavior that is largely autonomous 
and resistant to outside forces. Despite years of research pushing 
against this understanding, those concepts remain firmly in 
place.110 Given the long history of psychologists and criminal law 
scholars failing to convert judges to their situationist cause, it is 
 
(Tade M. Spranger ed., 2012). One significant change in criminal law that can 
be traced to neuroscience is the prohibition of certain punishments for juvenile 
offenders under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. In three recent cases, the Supreme Court referenced neuroscien-
tific studies of the adolescent brain to deem juveniles less culpable and more 
capable of reform than adult offenders. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 
n.5 (2012) (barring mandatory sentence of life-without-parole for juvenile of-
fenders in homicide cases); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (barring 
mandatory sentence of life-without-parole for juvenile offenders in non-homi-
cide cases); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (barring death penalty 
for crimes committed by juvenile offenders). Rather than representing a funda-
mental transformation of the criminal law, however, these cases fit into a larger 
pattern of using psychological research to carve out special exceptions for chil-
dren. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 836 (1990) (relying on insights 
from clinical psychology to uphold a Maryland statute that allowed children to 
testify via one-way closed circuit television); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and 
Social Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 13 
(2002) (describing successful efforts by psychologists to place certain decisions 
in legal disputes involving children in the hands of clinical experts and away 
from the jury). 
 108. For decades, neuroscience has called the ability of individuals to take 
conscious control of their actions into question. A primitive but well-publicized 
EEG study from 1983 detected brain activity predicting the action of pushing a 
button hundreds of milliseconds before the actor became consciously aware that 
she intended to push the button. See Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious 
Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness Potential): 
The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 BRAIN 623, 623–24 
(1983). 
 109. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Backlash: The Reaction to Mind Sci-
ences in Legal Academia, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 501, 520–30 (Jon 
Hanson ed., 2012). 
 110. See id. at 503; see also MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, 
MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEU-
ROSCIENCE 36 (2013) (contrasting law’s default rule towards individuals being 
responsible for their actions with psychologists’ greater concern with environ-
mental influences on behavior). 
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perhaps not surprising that neuroscience’s impact has been sim-
ilarly limited. 
The recent history of criminal law and neuroscience illus-
trates a larger pattern. Just as there is a problem with assuming 
that neuroscience will transform criminal law, it is unlikely that 
neuroscience will uproot the distinctiveness and likelihood of 
confusion analyses. It would be destabilizing to replace these 
doctrines. These two analyses are the linchpins of trademark lit-
igation and have existed in relatively the same form for forty 
years.111 They afford judges a tremendous amount of discretion, 
which would be forfeit if junked in favor of fMRI results. 
Judges are loathe to cede large territories of authority to 
outside experts.112 However compelling, psychological insights 
typically do not replace wholesale the established prerogatives 
of judges and juries.113 Although law is fundamentally concerned 
with human behavior and neuroscientific evidence is changing 
our view of human behavior, ultimately legal precepts involve 
value judgments that are rarely shaken by scientific evidence, 
no matter how empirically compelling.114 The author of a com-
prehensive analysis of legislation relating to neuroscience finds 
that “neuroscience is typically embraced when it affirms, rather 
than challenges, preexisting normative commitments.”115 Pre-
dictions of neuroscience’s transformative impact on the law need 
to be leavened by an appreciation of the fundamentally conserva-
tive nature of legal change.  
 
 111. See Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Competition: The Recent His-
tory, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 28–33 (1996) (discussing the history of the 
distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion analyses). 
 112. Craig Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual 
Jurisprudence, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 165 (1980). 
 113. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides that, in criminal 
cases, “an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defend-
ant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element 
of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” 
FED. R. EVID. 704(b). Even in the civil context, courts must exclude expert tes-
timony that defines legal terms or offers “nothing more than a legal conclusion.” 
Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1220 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 114. ANDREAS KAPARDIS, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUC-
TION 12 (2d ed. 2003) (“[T]he prevailing legal model of man entails a conscious 
mind. . . . [T]his model is unlikely to be shifted in the face of psychological 
knowledge.”). 
 115. Francis X. Shen, Neurolegislation: How U.S. Legislators Are Using 
Brain Science, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 495, 498 (2016). 
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B. LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND KALVEN’S MIDDLE RANGE 
But if neuroscience will not revolutionize trademark doc-
trine, it will likely shape it in significant albeit contained ways. 
Deeply held values like the criminal justice system’s focus on in-
dividual blame will always withstand assault from psychological 
evidence to the contrary. At the same time, well-known factual 
propositions like the unreliability of hearsay have no need for 
bolstering from psychological study. In between these two poles 
lies the area where outside study of human behavior can reshape 
the law.  
The legal scholar Harry Kalven speculated that social sci-
ence influences the law in a “middle range” “where the premises 
are not that unshakeable and where the facts are not that acces-
sible.”116 Changes to this middle area do not threaten to topple 
fundamental pillars of the legal system. Because their effects are 
limited in scope, such changes are also less threatening to judi-
cial prerogatives and more likely to be accepted. 
The introduction of psychologist-approved surveys of con-
sumer confusion in trademark cases offers an instructive exam-
ple of the phenomenon Kalven described. In the early twentieth 
century, reformers called for replacing the ad hoc “judicial esti-
mate of the state of the public mind”117 with psychologist expert 
testimony.118 The most concrete and lasting innovation proposed 
by the reformers was to use expert-led consumer surveys to 
demonstrate confusion.119 Multiple psychologists contended that 
their expertise was needed to rein in a body of law being mishan-
dled by untrained judges.120 
Rather than being offended by the psychologists’ presump-
tion to tell the judiciary how to do their job, a Second Circuit 
 
 116. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry 
and Legal Policy, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 56, 65–67 (Geoffrey Hazard, 
Jr. ed., 1968). 
 117. FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RE-
LATING TO TRADE-MARKS 166 (1925). 
 118. Edward S. Rogers, The Unwary Purchaser: A Study in the Psychology 
of Trade Mark Infringement, 8 MICH. L. REV. 613, 621–22 (1910). 
 119. Other, more ambitious initiatives didn’t fare so well, like a call in the 
1930s for “plain psychological facts” to replace legal concepts of intent, the rea-
sonable person, and stare decisis. Wallace D. Loh, Psycholegal Research: Past 
and Present, 79 MICH. L. REV. 659, 664 (1981). 
 120. See, e.g., HUGO MUNSTERBERG, PSYCHOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL EFFI-
CIENCY 285 (1913); Harold E. Burtt, Measurement of Confusion Between Similar 
Trade Names, 19 ILL. L. REV. 320, 336 (1924–25); Edward S. Rogers, An Account 
of Some Psychological Experiments on the Subject of Trade-Mark Infringement, 
18 MICH. L. REV. 75, 77 (1919). 
  
2018] NEUROMARKS 549 
 
judge cited an academic psychologist’s results to proclaim that 
judicial assays of confusion “failed to match the responses of or-
dinary consumers.”121 Other courts agreed to shore up their anal-
ysis by admitting in as evidence the surveys of consumer confu-
sion conducted by psychologists.122 Not every judge welcomed 
the intrusion of outside “experts” into an area that had tradition-
ally been within their sole discretion. In fact, some courts balked, 
refusing to accept consumer surveys.123 Nevertheless, the overall 
trend was one of more and more surveys being accepted into ev-
idence.124 
The admission of survey evidence of consumer perception 
fits within Kalven’s middle range where social science can influ-
ence the law. The survey evidence proffered by early twentieth-
century psychologists did not purport to uproot a deeply held le-
gal premise. It simply provided evidence of “actual confusion,” 
albeit in an artificial setting, not the actual marketplace.125 The 
results of these surveys tended to support rather than erode a 
general preference for strong trademark rights.126 Their admis-
sion into evidence seemed very much in keeping with the goals 
of trademark law.127 
 
 121. LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 
1946) (Frank, J., dissenting). 
 122. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Chero-Cola Co., 273 F. 755, 756–57 (D.C. Cir. 
1921); Robert Bonynge, Trademark Surveys and Techniques and Their Use in 
Litigation, 48 A.B.A. J. 329, 330 (1962). 
 123. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Sweets Labs., Inc., 137 F.2d 365, 368 
(C.C.P.A. 1943). This is not to suggest that judges cede all authority to outside 
experts once the decision is made to admit their testimony. Even after deciding 
to allow expert testimony into evidence, judges still maintain a role in policing 
and exposing scientific bias as testimony is presented. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCI-
ENCE AT THE BAR 20 (1995). This is even more true now in the wake of the U. S. 
Supreme Court’s Daubert decision, which replaced an earlier assessment of 
“general acceptance” of a proffered theory in the relevant scientific field with a 
more searching judicial interrogation of the research methods and analyses be-
hind expert testimony. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Science in 
Law: Continuity and Change, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 9) (on file with author). Even so, the intro-
duction of scientific evidence represents a lessening of judicial authority and 
one that judges must be convinced to accept. 
 124. See Shari Seidman Diamond & David J. Franklyn, Trademark Surveys: 
An Undulating Path, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2029, 2039–40 (2014); Robert J. Lavidge, 
Survey Research in Trademark Cases, 66 CHI. B. REC. 236, 236 (1985). 
 125. See, e.g., Chero-Cola, 273 F. at 757 (using survey evidence as proof of 
“actual confusion”). 
 126. See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trade-
mark Law, 38 N.M. L. REV. 1, 26 (2008). 
 127. See id. 
  
550 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:521 
 
Other attempts by psychologists to change legal doctrine in 
this era foundered when critics deemed the common sense of 
judges and juries to be sufficient.128 Judges believed that psy-
chologists offering advice on witness veracity in the early twen-
tieth century seemed to offer a solution to a problem that did not 
exist. After all, they already considered themselves (and the ju-
ries they instructed) adept at assessing the credibility of wit-
nesses.129 Trademark survey evidence differed in that it pur-
ported to measure the thought processes of not just one person, 
but the entire consuming public. Although judges and juries rou-
tinely assessed the mental states of individual defendants, there 
was less comfort with having the trier of fact speak for an entire 
mass of shoppers.130 Psychologists touted their unique ability to 
study consumer thought “objectively by psychological experi-
ments . . . [using] the laboratory method.”131 As a result, judges 
accepted the professional qualifications of consumer psycholo-
gists and admitted the surveys they conducted into evidence.132  
Over time, surveys became a critical component of modern 
trademark law. The early skepticism over such evidence largely 
vanished. Today, trademark law’s leading scholar maintains 
that surveys have reached a level of reliability such that they 
should be routinely admitted to guide the determination of 
trademark disputes.133 Although some empirical studies suggest 
that survey evidence plays a less-than-decisive role in the ma-
jority of trademark infringement decisions,134 the research also 
 
 128. Blumenthal, supra note 107, at 8. 
 129. Cf. id. (“[O]n almost every topic that has a proximate and practical re-
lation to the trustworthiness of testimony delivered in court, the judges have 
the psychologists ‘beaten a mile’ [sic].” (quoting Charles C. Moore, Yellow Psy-
chology, 11 L. NOTES 125, 125 (1907))). 
 130. See Bartholomew, supra note 126, at 24–25 (describing how Progressive 
movement members advocated for expert-led surveys because of their ability to 
remove judicial biases). 
 131. Burtt, supra note 120, at 335.  
 132. See Blumenthal, supra note 107, at 25–26. 
 133. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 32:196 (contending that judges “know 
that the techniques of testing and sampling buyer reactions have been devel-
oped to a fairly high degree of accuracy”).  
 134. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for 
Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1641–42 (2006) [hereinafter 
Beebe, Empirical Study] (sampling 331 opinions and finding that survey evi-
dence only played a role, let alone a decisive one, in twenty percent of them); see 
also Kevin Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of 
Barton Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringe-
ment, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 30 (repeating Beebe’s research using a fif-
teen-year sample of cases). 
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shows that surveys can strongly influence the infringement 
analysis when introduced135 and are employed widely in the pre-
trial stages of trademark litigation.136 In addition to surveying 
confusion, modern experts provide surveys relating to mark dis-
tinctiveness, strength, and dilution.137 Scholars in other legal 
disciplines have noticed, describing trademark law’s favorable 
treatment of surveys as placing it at the vanguard of incorporat-
ing social science evidence into adjudication.138 
Consumer neuroscience evidence may work its way into 
trademark law in a similar fashion as survey evidence. At least 
in the near term, it will not replace judicial estimates of con-
sumer perception. But it will influence those estimates and, as a 
result, alter specific areas of trademark law. These probable ar-
eas of influence can be divided into two broad categories: evi-
dence and doctrine. 
 
 135. Beebe, Empirical Study, supra note 134, at 1641 (“It is generally 
thought that survey evidence is the best evidence of actual confusion, and in-
deed, that a good survey has the potential to supersede the rest of the multifac-
tor analysis.”); Robert C. Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of Consumer Surveys 
in Trademark Infringement: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 1013, 1041 (2012) (“In some situations, survey evidence can have 
a profound impact.”).  
 136. Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 124, at 2062 (arguing that reported 
cases underrepresent the role of surveys and that surveys often play an im-
portant role in pretrial litigation). 
 137. See Krista F. Holt & Scot A. Duvall, Chasing Moseley’s Ghost: Dilution 
Surveys Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1311, 
1324–29 (2008) (describing the use of surveys to find mark dilution and distinc-
tiveness under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act); Jerre B. Swann, An In-
terdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 943, 960–61, 
973–74 (2006) (describing the use of surveys in evaluating mark strength using 
Adidas as an example). Some courts even draw adverse inferences from the ab-
sence of such evidence. See Beebe, Empirical Study, supra note 134, at 1641 
(“Some circuits even apply an adverse inference of no likelihood of confusion if 
the plaintiff has the resources and time to produce survey evidence but fails to 
do so.”); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 12:14 (“Consumer surveys have 
become almost de rigueur in litigation over genericness.”). This can be especially 
so when there has been a long period of simultaneous use of the plaintiff ’s and 
defendant’s marks. Id. § 23:18 (quoting Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 
F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 1999)).  
 138. James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in 
Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1681–82 (2003) (comparing 
the use of surveys in trademark law with their nonuse in voluntary integration 
and affirmative action cases). 
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C. EVIDENCE 
As its reliability increases, like survey evidence, neural in-
dications of a trademark’s acquired distinctiveness and con-
sumer confusion are likely to be accepted into evidence in trade-
mark cases. Consumer neuroscientists can claim a core 
professional competence lacked by judges. Instead of simply re-
flecting common sense, fMRI imaging offers evidence of con-
sumer thought “in situations in which consumers are unlikely to 
say what they think, because they can’t or they won’t.”139 Rather 
than challenging an essential value in trademark law, neuroim-
aging’s proponents can follow in the path of consumer surveys 
and promise a supplement for understanding consumer percep-
tion. The premium already placed on expert-led surveys of dis-
tinctiveness and confusion should favorably predispose courts to 
the admission of neuroscientific evidence on these issues.140  
One might question the need for neuroscientific evidence of 
acquired distinctiveness and confusion given the consumer be-
havioral studies that are already submitted to courts in the form 
of survey data.141 In fact, persistent reliability problems with 
survey evidence make a neuroscientific supplement desirable. 
Surveys requesting a consumer’s verbal response to whether or 
not a symbol indicates the source of a product can be flawed and 
trigger misleading responses. A survey respondent may be 
prompted to view a mark that merely describes a product’s qual-
ities (e.g., COLD AND CREAMY for ice cream) as a source iden-
tifier from the call of the question rather than her own unbiased 
perception of the mark. For example, to ascertain acquired dis-
tinctiveness, surveys often present consumers with a descriptive 
mark and then immediately ask: “Does this [mark] identify any 
particular brands, products, or companies to you, or not?”142 One 
may wonder whether the respondent would have matched the 
 
 139. Uma R. Karmarkar et al., Marketers Should Pay Attention to fMRI, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 3, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/11/marketers-should-pay 
-attention-to-fmri. 
 140. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text. 
 141. This contention that brain imaging offers little beyond what behavioral 
studies already tell us is a common critique of neuroscience’s utility in general. 
As Stephen Morse puts it, “Actions speak louder than images, EEG findings, or 
neuropsychological tests, behavioral genetics, or any of the other types of neu-
roevidence courts are confronted with.” Stephen J. Morse, Actions Speak Louder 
Than Images: The Use of Neuroscientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 3 J.L. & 
BIOSCIENCES 336, 340 (2016). 
 142. David H.B. Bednall et al., Color, Champagne, and Trademark Second-
ary Meaning Surveys: Devilish Detail, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 967, 977 (2012). 
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mark with any brand or product if not for the question’s prompt-
ing. Similar concerns can limit the influence of survey evidence 
of consumer confusion.143 
By contrast, neuroimaging results offer the same benefit for 
courts assessing consumer perception that they do for market 
researchers: the promise of a consumer’s unfiltered, immediate 
responses to an advertising stimulus, without falsehoods or an-
swers that the respondent thinks the questioner wants to 
hear.144 Brain scans do not even require a question to be asked. 
Test subjects can simply be shown the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s 
marks and their resulting brain activity analyzed.145 As a result, 
two sources of bias are seemingly ameliorated through neurolog-
ical scans of consumers: that of consumers failing to reveal their 
“true” impressions of a mark and that of survey administrators, 
whether accidentally or by design, skewing the results through 
their interrogation of respondents.146  
Admittedly, both surveys and neurological scans of consum-
ers can be attacked for not replicating real-world shopping con-
ditions or for failing to sample individuals within the relevant 
purchasing class. To be probative, a consumer experiment must 
recreate the essential shopping experience.147 And, for the most 
 
 143. See, e.g., Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country 
Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that confusion surveys 
“conducted by party-hired expert witnesses are prone to bias,” including the 
“phrasing of questions in a way that is intended to elicit the surveyor’s desired 
response—confusion or lack thereof—from the survey respondents”). 
 144. See Dan Ariely & Gregory S. Berns, Neuromarketing: The Hope and 
Hype of Neuroimaging in Business, 11 NATURE REVIEWS 284, 284 (2010) (stat-
ing neuroimaging is desirable “based on the assumptions that people cannot 
fully articulate their preferences when asked to express them explicitly, and 
that consumers’ brains contain hidden information about their preferences”); 
see also supra Part I.B. 
 145. See id. (describing how participants can simply be shown an advertise-
ment while their brain is monitored). 
 146. This is not to say that neural imaging offers a perfect window into test 
subjects’ thoughts. Although some studies successfully used fMRI imaging to 
identify when a research subject had been told to lie, other studies reveal that 
research participants can take simple countermeasures to defeat such veracity 
screenings. Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-Based Lie Detection: Scien-
tific and Societal Challenges, 15 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 123, 127 (2014). 
But neural imaging does allow for instantaneous recording of responses to com-
mercial stimuli, a feature that arguably should contribute to more accurate 
readings of consumer sentiment than traditional survey evidence. See Rolando 
Grave de Peralta Menendez et al., Electrical Neuroimaging Based on Biophysi-
cal Constrains, 21 NEUROIMAGING 527, 528 (2004) (characterizing neuroimag-
ing recording as “instantaneous”). 
 147. See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1327 
(N.D. Ga. 2008) (“To be valid for the purposes of demonstrating actual confusion 
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part, trademark law only concerns itself with likely purchasers 
of the items at issue.148 Surveys that inaccurately reflect the 
marketplace or sample the wrong consumer universe may be de-
clared inadmissible.149 Yet if these concerns have not prevented 
all consumer surveys from being accepted into evidence, it is un-
likely that they will prevent neuroimaging results from being ac-
cepted into evidence either. Indeed, as neural imaging technolo-
gies become more portable, it will become easier to simulate the 
shopping environments actually encountered by consumers.150 
Finally, it bears repeating that even flawed scientific tech-
niques can find their way into the courtroom. I have tried to doc-
ument the limitations to consumer neuroscience that might 
make one question its evidentiary role in trademark cases. Yet 
stacked against those limitations are precedent in trademark 
law for the admission of survey evidence of consumer perception, 
the growing use of neuroscience evidence in criminal law cases, 
and continuing investments and technological advances that will 
only increase the ability of neural imaging to shed light on con-
sumer behavior. 
D. DOCTRINE 
In contrast to presenting evidence relevant to established 
legal doctrine (e.g., the presence of actual confusion among con-
sumers or a defendant’s sanity or lack thereof in determining 
mens rea in a criminal prosecution), social science research can 
also produce formal doctrinal change.151 We might consider this 
 
in a trademark infringement suit, it is necessary for a survey’s protocol to take 
into account marketplace conditions and typical consumer behavior . . . .”). 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 1325 (“The appropriate universe in this case is the con-
sumers most likely to purchase [Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant]’s . . . merchan-
dise.”). 
 149. See, e.g., id. at 1325–26 (“Other courts have similarly criticized sur-
veys . . . that failed to properly screen the universe to endure that it was limited 
to respondents who were potential purchasers of the alleged infringer’s prod-
uct.”). 
 150. See Arkadiusz Stopczynski et al., The Smartphone Brain Scanner: A 
Portable Real-Time Neuroimaging System, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 3–8 (2014) (utilizing 
smartphone-based neuroimaging technology as a portable research tool); see 
also supra notes 45–48. In fact, expert presentation of visual stimuli and corre-
sponding neural reactions may be less prone to attack than text-based survey 
questions and reported reactions from consumers. Neuroscience advocates can 
point to their discipline’s ability to sample consumer perception with reduced 
danger of research subjects providing misleading information, either because of 
a desire to misrepresent their own thoughts or an inability to communicate 
them. 
 151. Allowing in expert testimony as to facts in dispute can produce informal 
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as the doctrinal shaping function of psychological findings or as 
what John Monahan describes as the “social authority” function 
of social science research.152 
Admittedly, progress in the study of the human mind has 
not fundamentally altered legal doctrine, much to the chagrin of 
those working in the field of law and psychology. “Despite its 
long history, though, the law and psychology movement has not 
caused any real waves in the law,” bemoans one expert in the 
field.153 Instead, there have been narrow areas of success where 
psychological insights have made their presence felt in the law. 
The same will likely be true of consumer neuroscience.154 The 
law acts in a fundamentally conservative and opportunistic man-
ner when it comes to psychology. As put colorfully by one psy-
chologist and legal scholar, “The law uses psychology like a 
drunk uses a lamp post—more for support than illumination.”155 
Neural imaging will reshape the doctrines of distinctiveness, 
confusion, and dilution in trademark law, but in somewhat sub-
tle ways likely to redound to the benefit of trademark holders. 
1. Evaluating Distinctiveness 
The ability to use neural imaging to determine if consumers 
have a memory of a particular consumer stimulus will likely pro-
vide new evidence relevant to assessing acquired distinctive-
ness. But what about determining inherent distinctiveness, i.e., 
whether a trademark communicates the source of goods to a con-
sumer regardless of their prior experience with the trademark?  
Better understanding of consumer thought could destabilize 
the tests developed to determine whether trademarks are inher-
ently distinctive. Take, for example, the imagination test, which 
separates inherently distinctive “suggestive” marks from merely 
descriptive ones. 
 
doctrinal changes. For example, the admission of survey evidence in trademark 
cases led to a more generous understanding of consumer confusion. See Barthol-
omew, supra note 126. Here, however, I am describing something different—
research that causes legal frameworks to undergo explicit changes.  
 152. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evalu-
ating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 478 
(1986). 
 153. James R.P. Ogloff, Two Steps Forward and One Step Backward: The 
Law and Psychology Movement(s) in the 20th Century, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
457, 464 (2000); see also Haney, supra note 112, at 151 (“Unlike other behavioral 
sciences, psychology has been slow to formalize its relationship with law.”). 
 154. See Ogloff, supra note 153, at 464–65 (listing areas psychology has 
failed to have a large impact). 
 155. Id. at 477. 
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[T]rademark doctrine presumes that consumers see suggestive marks 
as inherently distinctive because there is a weak connection between 
the mark selected and the product sold. The law presumes this weak 
connection leaves consumers with no choice but to make an ‘imagina-
tive leap’ to connect the mark with the designated product.156 
In applying the imagination test, courts contend that certain 
words cause consumers to engage in a “multi-stage” or “inferen-
tial” reasoning process to determine a product’s attributes based 
on the mark at issue.157 A trademark that forces a consumer to 
employ this kind of higher-order thought process is inherently 
distinctive. For example, an adjudicatory panel assumed that 
the mark BRIDAL KEEPSAFE for boxes that hold wedding 
gowns requires consumers to engage in this sort of advanced rea-
soning.158 But, of course, the judges on the panel did not really 
know. 
Ideally, fMRI readings would someday shed light on when 
consumers actually make a “mental leap from the mark to the 
product.”159 As noted earlier, neuroscientists have identified 
neural correlates for specific mental states like feelings of lone-
liness and surprise.160 At the same time, however, the complex-
ity of higher-order thought processes eludes modern brain sci-
ence, in part because these thought processes are so poorly 
understood. For example, there are no widely accepted neural 
measures for schizophrenia despite years of neuroscientific 
 
 156. Linford, supra note 33, at 1371. But this may not necessarily be the 
case. When confronted with a suggestive mark, the consumer may fail to make 
this leap, instead extracting different information from the word at issue. Many 
marks considered suggestive under the imagination test evoke desirable infor-
mation about product qualities. Id. at 738–39. Linguistic theory reveals that the 
sounds of vowels and consonants in words convey meaning regardless of the 
literary definition (or lack thereof )  in the word at issue. Id. at 734. For example, 
if asked to distinguish between two imaginary pieces of furniture, eighty per-
cent of respondents believe that one named “Mal” will be bigger than one named 
“Mil.” Id. Keep this in mind the next time you go furniture shopping at IKEA. 
See Anne Quito, The Secret Taxonomy Behind IKEA’s Product Names, From 
Billy to Poӓ ng, QUARTZ (Jan. 30, 2017), https://qz.com/896146/how-ikea-names 
-its-products-the-curious-taxonomy-behind-billy-poang-malm-kallax-and-rens.  
 157. See Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 763 (6th Cir. 2005) (cit-
ing Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm, 747 F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1984)); 
Heartland Animal Clinic, P.A. v. Heartland SPCA Animal Med. Clinic, LLC, 
861 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1300 (D. Kan. 2012). 
 158. In re Cleaner’s Supply, Inc., No. 75/582,044, 2003 WL 169796, at *2 
(T.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2003). 
 159. Marketquest Grp., Inc. v. BIC Corp., No. 11-CV-618 JLS (WMC), 2011 
WL 5360899, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011) (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. 
v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 160. See sources cited supra note 68. 
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study of this particular mental disease.161 The mental gymnas-
tics involved in assessing whether a consumer is engaging in a 
multi-stage reasoning process when ascertaining the role of a 
commercial symbol are too difficult to pinpoint using current 
technologies.162 This means that admissible neuroscientific evi-
dence of inherent distinctiveness is unlikely, at least in the near 
term. Researchers are on safer ground when probing consumer 
memories to assess acquired distinctiveness.163  
2. Reweighing the Confusion Factors 
Courts routinely caution that application of the likelihood of 
confusion factors is meant to be flexible and the weight given to 
any particular factor can adjust to the circumstances of each 
case.164 The unsettled state of the factors offers opportunity for 
doctrinal change. Neuroscience may influence how infringement 
is calculated by placing a greater premium on direct evidence of 
confusion. Some of the likelihood of confusion factors (actual con-
fusion and mark strength) are likely to take on more salience 
when amplified by neurological measurement. Others (similar-
ity of the marks, relatedness of goods or services, and defend-
ant’s intent) will probably decline in importance. 
As consumer neuroscience develops, the actual confusion 
factor may become more important to the likelihood of confusion 
analysis. Already, the direct nature of actual confusion evidence, 
as opposed to the indirect evidence that comprises the rest of the 
likelihood of confusion factors, exerts a strong pull on judges. As 
stated by the Fifth Circuit, “[t]here can be no more positive or 
substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion than proof of ac-
tual confusion.”165 Consumer neuroscientists can see what a con-
sumer’s brain looks like when it views a particular trademark, 
 
 161. WILLIAM R. UTTAL, MIND AND BRAIN: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF COGNI-
TIVE NEUROSCIENCE 368 (2011). 
 162. See id. (describing why modern technology is unable to directly observe 
cognitive processes, either because of overflow of information in the case of 
EEGs or because of excess pooling of information for fMRIs). 
 163. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Chen et al., supra note 18, at 455 (refer-
ring to memory as a relatively “basic cognitive process”). 
 164. See Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2004) (stressing 
that the factors “operate only as a heuristic device to assist in determining 
whether confusion exists”); Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 
F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The factors should not be rigidly weighed; we 
do not count beans.”). 
 165. World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 
489 (5th Cir. 1971). Although artificial constructs, consumer surveys are typi-
cally classified as “actual confusion” evidence. See, e.g., Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-
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and they can potentially look for the same pattern when consum-
ers see an allegedly infringing mark.166 At the level of doctrine, 
the admission of such evidence is likely to make the actual con-
fusion factor loom even larger in the judicial imagination. 
The mark strength factor will take on greater weight in the 
likelihood of confusion analysis as well. Every federal court as-
sesses the strength of the plaintiff ’s mark as part of its calcula-
tion of whether consumers are likely to be confused by the de-
fendant’s actions.167 Mark strength is a question of 
distinctiveness: the more strength a mark has, the “more con-
sumers who use the mark as a source identifier.”168 Consumer 
neuroscientists are getting more skilled at being able to measure 
the ability of brands to capture attention and remain in 
memory.169 Mark strength is already central to likelihood of con-
fusion.170 It may become even more important once it appears 
susceptible to direct measurement through fMRI and EEG read-
ings.  
By contrast, other parts of the confusion analysis that do not 
offer a direct measurement of actual consumer perception may 
recede in importance once images and data from neural scans 
are admitted into evidence. It makes eminent sense to consider 
mark similarity and relatedness of goods in evaluating the po-
tential for confusion. But courts have wrestled for decades with 
the degree of similarity and relatedness needed to confuse con-
sumers. In applying these factors, the trier of fact is placed in 
 
Sys., Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2013) (evaluating a party’s consumer 
survey for “evidence of actual confusion”). 
 166. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 167. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 11:73 (“All courts agree that ‘stronger’ 
marks are given ‘stronger’ protection . . . .”). 
 168. Bone, supra note 16, at 1346. In determining mark strength, courts ac-
tually consider two things. The more distinctive the mark, the greater strength 
it is considered to have and the less likelihood there is of confusion. Id. Hence, 
the court’s previous analysis of distinctiveness is imported into the likelihood of 
confusion analysis. Courts also consider a mark’s “market strength,” relying on 
many of the factors one reviews in an analysis of secondary meaning (e.g., total 
sales, amount spent on advertising). Id.; see, e.g., Bridgestone Ams. Tire Oper-
ations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (evaluating mar-
ket strength of a mark based partially on sales and advertising expenses). 
Hence, to the extent neuroscientific evidence alters the distinctiveness analysis, 
it will alter the mark strength calculation as well. 
 169. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 170. See Beebe, Empirical Study, supra note 134, at 1633–34 (“[I]n opinions 
that do address the issue of trademark strength, and inherent strength in par-
ticular, there is a surprisingly good correlation between inherent strength and 
success in the multifactor test.”). 
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the uncomfortable position of trying to channel consumer 
thought. It takes a certain amount of chutzpah for one person in 
black robes to decide whether consumers will perceive the “Bur-
gatory” and “Burger Story” marks similarly. Although some 
courts seem to have great faith in their ability to make this sort 
of judgment,171 others are less sanguine. As one court noted: “the 
most successful form of copying is to employ enough points of 
similarity to confuse the public with enough points of difference 
to confuse the courts.”172 Already mistrustful of their own 
guesses as to which mark resemblances strike too close to home, 
courts may be even less tempted to rely on these guesses when 
they can place their faith in tangible neural evidence of actual 
confusion. 
The confusion factor most likely to suffer from trademark 
law’s neural turn is the defendant’s intent. As neural evidence of 
confusion becomes more compelling, intent’s role as a proxy for 
infringement seems likely to wane.173 Arguably, intent is indi-
rectly relevant to confusion because of the probability that a de-
fendant who wants to sow the seeds of trademark confusion will 
be successful in doing so. But this is a very speculative justifica-
tion. Just because the defendant intends to confuse consumers, 
there is no reason to believe that the defendant will accomplish 
its intended goal. As direct neuroscientific evidence of actual con-
fusion and mark strength makes those factors appear more reli-
able, the unreliable nature of the defendant’s intent factor will 
stand out even more.174 
 
 171. For example, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit compared two 
cans of tobacco products, concluded that “no one who saw these cans side by side 
could be confused about who makes which,” and disclaimed any interest in 
“traips[ing] through the list” of likelihood of confusion factors. Top Tobacco, L.P. 
v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 381, 383 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 172. Baker v. Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D.N.J. 1940). 
 173. Some already call for eliminating intent from the likelihood of confusion 
analysis. See Thomas L. Casagrande, A Verdict for Your Thoughts? Why an Ac-
cused Trademark Infringer’s Intent Has No Place in Likelihood of Confusion 
Analysis, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1447, 1471–75 (2011) (arguing that considera-
tion of intent should be limited to equitable issues). 
 174. As I have argued in other work, the intent factor reflects a moral stand-
ard rather than a genuine attempt to predict consumer perceptions. Mark Bar-
tholomew, Trademark Morality, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 85, 115 (2013). Yet the 
modern justification for trademark protection is so focused on protecting con-
sumers that courts no longer feel comfortable openly verbalizing the moral im-
perative that often shapes their interpretation of the intent factor. As a result, 
I would expect concerns over defendant intent to remain at play in trademark 
law, but to be even more submerged, sometimes steering interpretation of other 
factors, but not explicitly. 
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3. A Growing Role for Trademark Dilution 
Trademark dilution requires a demonstration of one of two 
different mental phenomena. “Dilution by blurring” demands 
proof that the similarity between the defendant’s and plaintiff ’s 
marks is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the plaintiff ’s 
mark.175 “Dilution by tarnishment” necessitates a showing that 
an association is likely to arise between the defendant’s and 
plaintiff ’s marks that “harms the reputation” of the plaintiff ’s 
mark.176 Like the distinctiveness and infringement inquiries, di-
lution doctrine depends on a series of judicial speculations about 
consumer cognition. 
Much like the likelihood of confusion analysis, the dilution 
by blurring analysis requires courts to march through a set of 
factors. As with likelihood of confusion, courts are likely to place 
increased weight on those factors that appear susceptible to di-
rect neural proof. For example, one factor is the existence of “any 
actual association” between the plaintiff ’s and the defendant’s 
marks.177 Determining what constitutes proof of actual associa-
tion has long bedeviled courts hearing dilution cases. Dilution 
represents a subconscious, spontaneous process that can be hard 
to measure through the considered responses of survey partici-
pants.178 In the future, however, association evidence could come 
in the form of neuroscientific studies where consumers were ex-
posed to the defendant’s mark and then scrutinized for evidence 
of brain activity matching the encoding of the plaintiff ’s mark. 
Such evidence would seem to avoid a frequent criticism of survey 
evidence: respondents’ inability to say what they really think.179 
 
 175. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
 176. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
 177. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(vi). 
 178. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Surveys in Dilution Cases II, in TRADE-
MARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN 155, 
157–62 (Shari Seidman Diamond & Jerre B. Swann eds., 2012) (discussing the 
difficulties of producing surveys that measure spontaneous association and as-
sess whether association is likely to impair distinctiveness of a mark). The prob-
lem is that this evidence often seems to beg the question. For example, a court 
credited a survey finding that eighty-seven percent of respondents said “Nike” 
when asked “What if anything, came to your mind when I first said the word 
Nikepal?” as evidence of actual association. Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., No. 
2:05-CV-1468-GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 2782030, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007). 
One might object that, rather than revealing actual consumer perception, such 
a question predisposes respondents to find an association. 
 179. Perhaps recognizing the difficulty in finding proof of actual association, 
courts accept testimony from isolated individuals who claim that seeing the de-
fendant’s mark made them think of the famous mark. One court held that a 
single person’s testimony that the store name “Victor’s Little Secret” made him 
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With better direct evidence of association, the “actual associa-
tion” factor might assume the same importance that the “actual 
confusion” factor already does in the likelihood of confusion anal-
ysis.180 
But consumer neuroscience’s largest doctrinal impact may 
be in the way it changes the cause of action for dilution by tar-
nishment. It is impossible to assess whether a mark’s reputation 
has been harmed without establishing a baseline for what that 
reputation is. Courts in dilution cases have responded to this dif-
ficulty by limiting the dilution by tarnishment cause of action to 
use of the famous mark with sex, drug, and nudity-related prod-
ucts.181 Use of a famous mark in products involving sex or nu-
dity, according to the courts, triggers negative connotations in 
 
think of plaintiff ’s VICTORIA’S SECRET mark was probative evidence of ac-
tual association. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 747–
48 (W.D. Ky. 2008). Similarly, other courts have found anonymous Twitter posts 
or an email from a single consumer to be compelling evidence of actual associa-
tion. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 
1611(PKC), 2012 WL 1022247, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (using Twitter 
posts); N.Y.C. Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305, 
319, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (using email). A representative sample of consumer 
brain activity should be more persuasive evidence of association than the im-
pressions of isolated individuals. 
 180. One could argue that neuroscientific evidence will make courts more 
skeptical of the entire dilution analysis. For example, according to the federal 
dilution statute, if the plaintiff ’s mark exhibits a high degree of distinctiveness 
and recognition, dilution by blurring is more likely. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) 
(2012). Proof of distinctiveness and recognition shows that a plaintiff has a lot 
to lose from the dilutive activities of other actors, but does it really correlate 
with blurring? It is possible that highly distinctive or recognized marks are more 
resistant to dilution by other actors, not less. See Paul J. Heald & Robert 
Brauneis, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of Trademark Dilu-
tion by Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2533, 2574–75 (2011) 
(speculating that supposedly dilutive uses can actually “reaffirm the famous 
mark in consumers’ minds”); id. at 2573 (noting that the “most well-known 
brands” are particularly resistant to dilution). It may be that consumers have 
built up such a strong mental map of what famous brands like COKE or LOUIS 
VUITTON mean that this impression is unlikely to be shaken by the activities 
of outside actors. See Barton Beebe et al., Testing for Trademark Dilution in 
Court and in the Lab, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 6–
7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2960082 (contending 
that the only existing empirical studies claiming to show that dilution occurs 
are invalid, leading the authors to question whether dilution even exists). Con-
sumer neuroscience studies could prove or disprove this theory, potentially 
making dilution by blurring a possibility for some well-known brands but not 
for the most famous brands of all. I think that such a path for consumer neuro-
science evidence is unlikely, however. At this point, we have left Kalven’s mid-
dle range and are coming close to psychological evidence eviscerating the dilu-
tion cause of action altogether.  
 181. Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 248 n.27 
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consumers’ brains.182 Other products do not.183 The rationale 
seems to be that even if harm to reputation cannot be measured, 
it can be presumed because of the assumed power of sexual im-
agery to shape our thinking.184 
Dilution by tarnishment has been not only difficult to define, 
but also difficult to measure, which may be one reason for the 
doctrinal fixation on sexually-related mark uses and a refusal to 
countenance a variety of other potentially tarnishing conduct. If 
neuroscience makes brand reputation more transparent, how-
ever, that could change. Brain mapping that defines a unique 
brand personality existing in consumers’ heads could establish a 
reputational baseline.185 Subsequent changes to this baseline af-
ter exposure to the defendant’s mark could be cited as evidence 
of tarnishment. For example, a consumer neuroscience expert 
might demonstrate that VOLVO stands for safety in a substan-
tial percentage of consumers’ minds and that the neural signa-
ture for safety diminishes after the introduction of VOLVO 
chainsaws.  
For some, using neuroscience to assess brand reputation 
might sound fantastic. It would seem that the complex web of 
associations we form over the course of our lives in relation to 
one particular commercial symbol would be difficult to neurolog-
ically test and vary widely from person to person. Yet finding 
generalizable neural associations for particular brand attributes 
is exactly what consumer neuroscientists claim to be able to do. 
By examining not just localized neural activity, but “correlated 
activity across a network of brain areas,” researchers discovered 
“highly distinctive associations,” even among similar brands like 
 
(2013). 
 182. One federal circuit even goes so far as to create a full-fledged rebuttable 
presumption that sex-related products are “likely to tarnish a famous mark if 
there is a clear semantic association between the two.” V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 
v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2010).  
 183. Jordana S. Loughran, Note, Tarnishment’s Goody-Two-Shoes Shouldn’t 
Get All the Protection: Balancing Trademark Dilution Through Burnishment, 
21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 453, 484 (2017) (“[C]ourts have construed the [dilu-
tion by tarnishment] claim narrowly to include only associations with sex, 
drugs, or nudity.”).  
 184. Perhaps this presumption is accurate, but we cannot be sure. One non-
neuroscientific study, which involved exposing subjects to posters of porno-
graphic versions of popular movies and questioning them about their perception 
of the original films, found no evidence of tarnishment. Christopher Buccafusco 
et al., Testing Tarnishment in Trademark and Copyright Law: The Effect of Por-
nographic Versions of Protected Marks and Works, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 341, 388 
(2016). 
 185. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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Apple and Microsoft.186 Perhaps even more impressive, these 
neural measurements of brand personality traits stayed rela-
tively constant across samples from different populations with 
“different demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.”187 
Researchers have not yet used neuroscientific tests to determine 
how marketing actions affect “the mental map of brand person-
ality,” but they describe such inquiries as “a natural next 
step.”188 With the ability to see tangible signs of mark reputation 
in consumers’ brains, courts may be emboldened to recognize tar-
nishment from more than just sexualized uses of a plaintiff ’s fa-
mous mark. Gradually adding to the small list of potentially tar-
nishing product areas would not eliminate a cause of action or 
fundamentally remake dilution law. Instead, it would be a dis-
crete expansion, falling into Kalven’s middle range where judges 
allow psychology to shape legal doctrine.  
To summarize, consumer neuroscience could soon change 
trademark adjudications in a number of ways. When it comes to 
evidence, courts appear likely to admit neuroscientific studies of 
acquired distinctiveness and confusion in the near future. Doc-
trinally, the neuroscientific turn may cause courts to privilege 
likelihood of confusion factors susceptible to direct neural evi-
dence though current technological limitations make changes to 
the tests for inherent distinctiveness unlikely. Perhaps most 
signficantly, by promising a biological measurement of mark 
reputation, neural scans will open the door to broader recogni-
tion of dilution by tarnishment beyond unauthorized uses relat-
ing to sex. The next Part examines whether any of these pre-
dicted changes would actually be good for trademark law. 
III.  HOW TRADEMARK LAW SHOULD ADAPT TO 
NEUROSCIENCE   
This Article contends that trademark law’s distinctiveness, 
confusion, and dilution analyses will change under the influence 
of consumer neuroscience. My hope is that these changes will not 
be accepted passively, but rather courts and legislators will re-
consider what they mean by these legal terms as neuroscience 
begins to alter their character. The dominant rationale for trade-
mark protection—the reduction of consumer search costs—is an 
inadequate normative guide for such a reconsideration. It offers 
 
 186. Chen et al., supra note 18, at 454, 459. 
 187. Id. at 459. 
 188. Id. at 463. 
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no logical stopping point when determining the importance of 
small changes in consumer perception as revealed through fMRI 
and EEG readings. Here, I offer a different principle—focusing 
judicial attention on consumers’ cognitive responses, not their 
emotional ones—to help steer trademark jurisprudence through 
a new technological chapter.  
A. THE NEED FOR FIRST PRINCIPLES 
As one psychologist notes in tracing the history of psychol-
ogy and American law, “experts and their techniques are expen-
sive and in the long run what they do will benefit whichever side 
commands the greatest resources.”189 Although gradually declin-
ing in cost, the techniques of neuroscience can be prohibitively 
expensive, leading to alliances between researchers and adver-
tisers.190 It is no accident that one of the focal points in neurosci-
entific research is studying how to make famous trademarks 
even more important to consumer decision making.191 It is well-
established brands, not upstarts, that are devoting resources to 
neuromarketing and related neuroscientific study of consumers. 
Fortune 500 companies regularly hire businesses like the Niel-
sen Company to run brain scans on prospective purchasers.192  
What do the brands guiding consumer neuroscience re-
search want for their money? Of course, they want to understand 
prospective shoppers better so that they can engineer more ef-
fective sales pitches. But when neuroscientific evidence is intro-
duced in court, these mark holders will want to reinforce a view 
of consumers as hurried and easily confused. This view of the 
 
 189. Haney, supra note 112, at 154. 
 190. Consumer neuroscience is becoming ingrained in academia. As psychol-
ogy departments and medical schools invest in neurotechnology, MBA students 
take neuromarketing classes. Institutions of higher learning routinely allow 
businesses to use their brain imaging equipment (for a hefty fee) to perform 
applied market research. Meanwhile, private organizations like eBay and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers hire university neuroscientists to 
scan representative members of their clientele and neuromarketing firms re-
cruit respected scientists to serve on their corporate boards. SATEL & LILIEN-
FELD, supra note 28, at ix; ZACK LYNCH, THE NEURO REVOLUTION: HOW BRAIN 
SCIENCE IS CHANGING OUR WORLD 49–56 (2009); R. Mark Wilson et al., Neuro-
marketing and Consumer Free Will, 42 J. CONS. AFFAIRS 389, 393 (2008). 
 191. See supra Part I.B; see also ERIK DU PLESSIS, THE BRANDED MIND: 
WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REALLY TELLS US ABOUT THE PUZZLE OF THE BRAIN AND 
THE BRAND 133–34 (2011) (discussing the growing role of neuroscience in mar-
keting as well as reasons why its adoption has been somewhat gradual). 
 192. Adam L. Penenberg, NeuroFocus Uses Neuromarketing to Hack Your 
Brain, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 8, 2011), https://www.fastcompany.com/1769238/ 
neurofocus-uses-neuromarketing-hack-your-brain. 
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consumer as a “moron in a hurry”193 makes it easier to win trade-
mark infringement verdicts and stop rival businesses. Whether 
use of a term is actually confusing to consumers or not, there is 
a strategic gain for mark holders in engineering a broad defini-
tion of consumer confusion to estop the advertising activities of 
competitors.194 
The incentives also align with research that will make it 
easier to demonstrate mark distinctiveness and dilution. When 
speaking to non-legal audiences, neuromarketing specialists 
stress the importance of maintaining control over aspects of the 
marketing environment discovered to have particular resonance 
in consumers’ minds.195 Businesses will want the law to make it 
easier for them to claim ownership of particular words, even 
when those words appear more descriptive of product character-
istics than product source. They will also endorse research sup-
porting a broader tarnishment doctrine, one that protects the 
emotional meanings designed for famous brands from more than 
just unauthorized sexualized uses.196  
The story of psychologist-sponsored trademark surveys of-
fers a cautionary example about the effects of scientific innova-
tion on trademark law.197 The introduction of survey evidence 
benefitted trademark holders by making confusion easier to 
prove. Psychological research of the early twentieth century em-
phasized consumers’ limited intellectual capabilities. Judges 
ended up trading earlier views of a cautious and logical consum-
ing public for a description of that public as “that vast multitude 
which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, 
who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are gov-
erned by appearances and general impressions.”198 These 
 
 193. Morning Star Coop. Soc’y Ltd. v. Express Newspapers Ltd. [1979] 
EWHC (Ch) 113 [117] (Eng.). 
 194. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 
722 (2004) (“In the context of trademark litigation, trademark holders aggres-
sively assert that consumers are extremely easy to confuse because judicial ac-
ceptance of this assumption facilitates victory in trademark infringement 
suits.”). 
 195. See, e.g., PATRICK M. GEORGES ET AL., NEUROMARKETING IN ACTION: 
HOW TO TALK AND SELL TO THE BRAIN 91 (2014) (emphasizing the importance 
of controlling all of the customer’s sensory inputs). 
 196. See, e.g., A.K. PRADEEP, THE BUYING BRAIN: SECRETS FOR SELLING TO 
THE SUBCONSCIOUS MIND 123 (2010) (discussing the need for companies to iden-
tify the “attributes of form” of their category of product, their product, and their 
competitor’s product in order to protect them using trademark law). 
 197. See supra Part II.B. 
 198. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910). 
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changes in legal doctrine, spurred by an embrace of the science 
of psychology, strengthened the hand of advertisers. By making 
it easier to assert trademark rights in merely descriptive terms 
and to demonstrate that consumers would be confused by alter-
native uses of those terms, courts turned trademarks into more 
powerful business resources, encouraging further investment in 
psychological techniques designed to burnish their emotional 
resonance with consumers.199 
One might object that consumer neuroscience need not favor 
trademark plaintiffs and that courts can only go where the evi-
dence takes them. But science is not value-neutral.200 Reading 
fMRI results requires interpretation, and there will be conse-
quences from interpreting brain images one way instead of an-
other. The concern is that judges and lawmakers may not appre-
ciate this. Even those excited about integrating neuroscientific 
evidence with legal doctrine caution against an “fMRI fetishism” 
that causes adjudicators to be more persuaded by this evidence 
than warranted and to fail to consider the implications of neuro-
scientific evidence in light of the underlying justifications behind 
different legal regimes.201 Moreover, once a new technology for 
tracking human behavior secures a place in legal doctrine or 
practice, it can become impossible to displace. Despite evidence 
showing the unreliability of much of forensic science, including 
ballistics tests and the matching of latent fingerprints, such ev-
idence has become a bedrock of the American criminal justice 
system.202  
Because history counsels that a better understanding of the 
brain means more evidence favorable to trademark holders, it is 
important that, from the outset, courts assess the influence of 
 
 199. See BARTHOLOMEW, supra note 95, at 111. 
 200. See Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677 (2016). 
 201. See Shen, supra note 6, at 1051; see also David P. McCabe & Alan D. 
Castel, Seeing Is Believing: The Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scien-
tific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 350–52 (2008) (showing that brain scans 
can cause potential jurors to accept flawed explanations of mental phenomena). 
 202. Epstein, supra note 92, at 605–07 (discussing the widespread use and 
unreliability of latent fingerprint matching); Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Chal-
lenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identifica-
tion, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2, 3 (2005) (contending that “all firearms 
and toolmark identification testimony should be excluded until adequate statis-
tical empirical foundations and proficiency testing are developed for the field”); 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Forensic Science (HBO television broad-
cast Oct. 1, 2017) (chronicling flaws in forensic science, including fingerprinting 
and DNA matching). 
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consumer neuroscientific evidence against a normative guide. 
Trademark law has a single dominant first principle: the reduc-
tion of consumer search costs.203 But this single principle is in-
adequate to assess the consequences of making it easier to prove 
mark distinctiveness, confusion, and dilution through neural im-
aging. 
B. THE INADEQUACY OF THE SEARCH COSTS JUSTIFICATION 
The elimination of search costs serves as the guiding justifi-
cation for modern trademark law. The search costs theory goes 
like this. Unauthorized trademark usage forces consumers to 
spend valuable time and effort to scrutinize advertising repre-
sentations. If I see an advertisement for a tablet computer fea-
turing the “Apple” name yet coming from a different entity than 
the Cupertino, California-based electronics colossus, I have to 
waste my limited cognitive and temporal resources evaluating 
the advertisement more closely than I would otherwise. Even if 
I do not end up purchasing the product under the mistaken as-
sumption that it comes from the Cupertino company, I will still 
have to scrutinize this commercial representation more heavily 
than if such an unauthorized use of the Apple mark was simply 
prohibited. Saving me from this wasted effort has become trade-
mark law’s prime directive. “[I]t would be nearly impossible to 
overstate the extent to which the search costs theory now domi-
nates as the theoretical justification of trademark law.”204 
 
 203. Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark 
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 75 (2012). 
 204. Id. Courts did not always have such an overriding focus on preventing 
confusion and supposedly thereby enhancing consumer efficiency. Instead, val-
ues separate from consumer protection once informed judicial decision-making 
in this area. One primary value was the need to protect producer goodwill; cul-
pable defendants were viewed as free-riders. William McGeveran & Mark P. 
McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 260 n.24 
(2013). This emphasis on trade diversion was problematic as well. It articulated 
a view of trademarks grounded in property rights rhetoric and was not sensitive 
to alternative concerns like consumer welfare, monopoly power, and free expres-
sion. Linford, supra note 33, at 1374 n.33. But, at least when practiced by courts 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the trade diversion ra-
tionale was cabined by advertising practice, which largely concerned itself with 
indicating the source of goods. Sonia Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1619 (2010). Compared to today’s practice of imbuing 
brands with deep emotional value, the stakes were lower when trademarks only 
served as a traffic sign informing consumers where prospective goods came 
from. Meanwhile, courts restricted trademark law’s scope to actions by direct 
competitors. McGeveran & McKenna, supra at 261. This helped avoid adjudica-
tions that might implicate broader speech or competition concerns. Id. 
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If search costs are the primary lens for interpreting con-
sumer neuroscience’s entry into trademark law, some changes 
stemming from trademark law’s impending neural turn appear 
salutary. Additional proof of acquired distinctiveness could help 
courts make more accurate judgments as to whether a word or 
symbol actually signals source to consumers. In this way, neuro-
science might help reduce the danger of trademark false posi-
tives: trademark protection for marks that do not actually indi-
cate source, which block competitors from effectively 
communicating with consumers while doing little to ease shop-
pers’ cognitive burdens.205 
Similarly, by focusing more attention on likelihood of confu-
sion factors that could be tethered to neural data of consumer 
perception (like mark strength and actual confusion), neurosci-
ence promises to better reconstruct consumer thought processes. 
That is arguably a good thing as well. A more accurate read of 
consumer confusion helps prevent unauthorized uses that send 
deceptive signals into the marketplace. From the search costs 
perspective, shoppers will be saved from spending unnecessary 
cognitive energy on carefully scrutinizing the origins of their pro-
spective purchases.206 
Yet there are drawbacks to simply evaluating the implica-
tions of consumer neuroscience in trademark law according to 
the search costs model. At least at first, importing neuroscien-
tific evidence into trademark law could create a trademark re-
gime of haves and have nots.207 We have already seen a version 
 
 205. See Linford, supra note 33, at 1374–75. Consumer neuroscience could 
have an even more positive impact if it could inform the judicial tests for inher-
ent distinctiveness. For example, as noted earlier, courts seize on double enten-
dres as proof that a mark serves as a source identifier. See supra note 34 and 
accompanying text. The courts considering SUGAR & SPICE for baked goods 
and L’EGGS for pantyhose maintained that, because they were double enten-
dres, these marks trigger multiple thoughts, including thoughts about source 
(and not just product qualities), in consumers’ heads. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-
Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 465 (4th Cir. 1996); Application of Colonial Stores Inc., 
394 F.2d 549, 552–53 (C.C.P.A. 1968). Alexandra Roberts disagrees, contending 
that “double entendres are indicia of mark owner creativity, not consumer per-
ception.” Roberts, supra note 15, at 1062. At this stage, however, the technology 
cannot shed much light on complex, ill-defined mental constructs like whether 
a double entendre triggers thoughts about source. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 206. See McKenna, supra note 203, at 73–81 (describing the search cost the-
ory). 
 207. Even if courts do begin to accept neural evidence of mark distinctive-
ness, poorer litigants might urge the continued use of judicially-derived tests 
for inherent distinctiveness at the initial stage of a trademark litigation or pros-
ecution for quick, efficient disposition of some cases. 
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of this with judicial presumptions against those who do not pay 
for survey evidence.208 Although the costs of neural imaging are 
decreasing, they still represent a significant expense for would-
be litigants.209 Smaller companies seeking to challenge the dis-
tinctiveness of a larger rival’s mark or defending themselves 
from an infringement claim may be forced to capitulate rather 
than suffer the expense of hiring a competing neuroscientific ex-
pert. If search costs remain the lodestar for courts assessing 
trademark infringement, a desire to prevent any confusion 
among consumers may further tilt an already unequal playing 
field in favor of deep-pocketed companies that can marshal the 
resources for neuroscientific evidence purporting to lay bare 
those search costs.210  
More importantly, there are different scenarios where con-
sumers may be considered confused and not all of them should 
give rise to an action for trademark infringement. Confusion is 
not just an empirical question, but a normative one as well.211 
The search costs justification offers no logical stopping point for 
a court trying to assess how much confusion is too much. For 
example, some courts have recognized “initial interest confu-
sion,” whereby a consumer first perceives a product as coming 
from the plaintiff but then quickly recognizes that the product 
actually comes from the defendant.212 Take the situation where 
a keyword search using a trademark on Google or Bing turns up 
a competitor’s website instead of the trademark holder’s, mo-
mentarily distracting the consumer before a purchase has been 
made. The courts have struggled with these scenarios, some-
times finding confusion, even though the confusion quickly dis-
sipates upon reaching the competitor’s website and consumers 
 
 208. See supra note 137. 
 209. See Baskin-Sommers & Fonteneau, supra note 88, at 424. 
 210. Eventually, the costs of neuroscientific testing of consumers will likely 
come down, allowing different kinds of market actors to take advantage of fMRI 
and EEG readings. See, e.g., Gary Boas, Low-Cost, High-Performance MRI 
Opens New Opportunities for Brain Imaging, MARTINOS CTR. NEWS. (Oct. 
15, 2015), https://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/news/20151015/low-cost-high 
-performance-mri-opens-new-opportunities-brain-imaging. At that point, how-
ever, precedents friendly to famous brand holders may be cemented into place. 
Cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of 
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 638 (2001) (ar-
guing that law is constrained by the circumstances under which it arises and 
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 211. Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 987 
(2012). 
 212. See, e.g., Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th 
Cir. 2006). 
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arguably benefit from exposure to more product choices when 
competitors can use rival brands as keyword search terms.213  
Today’s neural readers can detect fleeting changes in blood 
flow that last less than a second.214 The question for courts will 
be if an evanescent detection of confusion should dictate a find-
ing of infringement. As the financial backers of consumer neuro-
science strive to uncover more and more precise measurements 
of consumer confusion in the laboratory, evidence showing mo-
mentary confusion will be available to courts deciding trademark 
cases. Under the search costs theory, such evidence would be 
compelling proof of infringement.215  
Along similar lines, the search costs theory has been mobi-
lized to justify trademark dilution. According to some, consum-
ers experience so-called “internal search costs” when a familiar 
brand name is presented in a new context.216 To take one recent 
case, consumers may not be confused by the bawdy songs of a 
rapper named “Rolls Royce Rizzy” such that they would think 
the rapper formally partnered with the luxury car maker.217 But 
the disjunction between the rapper’s use of the famous brand 
and the car maker’s upper crust reputation might cause a mo-
mentary double take—an “internal search cost”—inside their 
 
 213. See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Comput. Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018 
(9th Cir. 2004); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 
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NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11026, 11026 (2000). 
 215. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer 
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 814 (2004) (describing case 
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per efficiency. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315–18 (4th Cir. 
2005). The problem is that trademark law offers little in the way of a developed 
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search costs to take center stage in the judicial imagination. 
 216. Tushnet, supra note 23, at 509; see also WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168, 
207 (2003) (describing “imagination cost”); Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological 
Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Con-
fusion, and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1047 (2001) (describing the 
“blurring of the mental associations evoked by [a] mark”). 
 217. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd. v. Davis, No. 15–0417 (KM), 2016 WL 
3913640, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2016). 
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heads. Prior studies, not dependent on neuroscience, supposedly 
showed that dilutive uses of a famous brand name (e.g., HEI-
NEKEN popcorn) caused consumers to take a few hundred mil-
liseconds longer to recall the famous brand than if they had 
never been exposed to the dilutive stimulus.218 Rebecca Tushnet 
maintains that such meagre impacts on consumer recall should 
be considered insufficient to demonstrate a legally-cognizable 
harm, particularly given the countervailing expressive interests 
of dilution defendants.219 Under the search costs theory, how-
ever, one could argue that the consumer should be protected 
from even a few hundred milliseconds of cognitive consterna-
tion.220 These moments of consumer bewilderment would become 
easier to prove upon the admission of fMRI and EEG readings.221 
C. ENCOURAGING CONSUMER DELIBERATION 
If the search costs theory represents a flawed guide for nav-
igating trademark law’s impending collision with neuroscience, 
what should take its place? This is a difficult question, with no 
agreed upon answer.222 Trademark law is about regulating ad-
vertising. As the legal scholar Arthur Leff wrote forty years ago: 
“There is no ‘whole story’ that can be told about anything, espe-
cially anything as socially, economically, literarily, anthropolog-
ically, philosophically, legally, historically, and politically com-
plex as advertising.”223 Taking Leff ’s comment to heart, my aim 
here is not to produce a new unified theory of trademark law to 
supplant the search costs model. Instead, my goal is a more mod-
est one of suggesting a supplemental principle—reinforcing 
 
 218. Tushnet, supra note 23, at 530. 
 219. Id. at 528 (“The dilution studies find some statistically significant dif-
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trademark law’s traditional role of interrogating and encourag-
ing cognitive, not emotional, reasoning—to aid courts wrestling 
with how to apply new evidence and understandings of human 
behavior to trademark doctrine. 
1. Two Systems of Consumer Reasoning 
Sometimes consumers think long and hard about a purchas-
ing decision; sometimes they operate instinctually. Psychologists 
posit dual reasoning models, the most famous and influential of 
which comes from Nobel prize-winning psychologist Daniel 
Kahneman. According to Kahneman, there are two systems of 
thought that can be at play when making a decision.224 One is an 
automatic, intuitive, largely unconscious process that Kahne-
man labels “System 1” reasoning.225 The other is a conscious, de-
liberate, rational weighing of costs and benefits he designates 
“System 2” reasoning.226 
One might describe System 1 as the emotional side of con-
sumer choice and System 2 as the deliberative side.227 System 
1’s instinctual decision making can be extremely useful. We do 
not have the cognitive resources to engage in a lengthy, rational 
internal dialogue about every choice we make. Imagine using the 
laborious System 2 model for every buying decision, no matter 
how small or routine. But the automaticity of System 1 can also 
translate into exploitable flaws and biases that advertisers can 
use to place consumers at a disadvantage.228 
Trademark law has traditionally focused its attention on 
System 2 reasoning even if it has not called it by that name. The 
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2018] NEUROMARKS 573 
 
law of trademarks polices the informational signals that con-
sumers rely on to determine the source of products and services 
offered for sale.229 When reliable, these signals help consumers 
make cognitive decisions about the source of goods.230 Source in-
dicators can be used to bring up memories of past experiences 
with the manufacturer and item at issue.231 They can also be 
used to find product reviews, whether from informal sources or 
institutions that test products. A trademark that serves as a 
source indicator can be used to access information released by 
government agencies (e.g., a product recall) or by competitors. 
All this information can be employed by the consumer to weigh 
the pros and cons of purchase. 
Courts emphasize the dispassionate, rational side of deci-
sion making in trademark decisions.232 This focus tends to train 
judicial attention on information used for rational choices rather 
than emotional instinct. Courts explain that “rational confusion” 
is the only kind of confusion that should be countenanced by 
trademark law.233 For example, the reason a judge gave for 
deeming a defendant’s use of the Wal-Mart name and “smiley 
face” marks non-infringing was that the defendant combined use 
of these trademarks with “unflattering words, images and por-
tions of words that no rational consumer would expect Wal-Mart 
to associate with its own marks.”234 
This is not to say, of course, that there is not an emotional 
component to branding. As neuroscience has made clear, there 
is a lot more conveyed by the COKE trademark than the prod-
uct’s origin from the Atlanta, Georgia-based soft-drink company. 
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ing for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the more competitive 
the market.”). 
 230. McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 204, at 272–73. 
 231. See Bradford, supra note 220, at 1245–46 (describing the interaction 
between trademarks and consumer memories of brands). 
 232. See Deven R. Desai, Bounded by Brands: An Information Network Ap-
proach to Trademarks, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 823–24 (2014) (maintaining 
that the most popular approach to analyzing consumer behavior for trademark 
law assumes that “consumers are rational gatherers and processors of infor-
mation as they make purchases”). 
 233. Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 653 F.3d 241, 252 n.12 
(3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] consumer survey should not be necessary or dispositive 
when it is plain from an advertisement that rational confusion is not possible.”). 
 234. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 
2008). 
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Advertisers spend most of their efforts trying to impregnate 
trademark words and symbols with emotional meaning, not 
simply providing consumers with factual inputs for System 2 
reasoning.235  
Sometimes courts deciding trademark cases acknowledge 
advertising’s emotional components. The U.S. Supreme Court 
described the “creation of a market through an established sym-
bol” as a “psychological current engendered by the various ad-
vertising devices which give a trade-mark its potency.”236 On 
rare occasions, judges see a threat, citing perceived attempts to 
play on consumers’ System 1-type reasoning as justification for 
narrowing trademark law’s scope. In the early twentieth cen-
tury, some judges and legal scholars attempted to divide brand 
loyalty into a rational type that warranted legal protection and 
an irrational one that did not. In their view, brand loyalty main-
tained through factors unrelated to product quality, “such as un-
reflective habit,” jeopardized rational consumer choice and, by 
extension, marketplace efficiency.237 In 1968, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals objected to using trademark law to protect a 
brand’s emotional hold on consumers: “The primary value of the 
modern trademark lies in the ‘conditioned reflex developed in 
the buyer’ . . . [t]o the extent that advertising of this type suc-
ceeds . . . economically irrational elements are introduced into 
consumer choices; and the trademark owner is insulated from 
the normal pressures of price and quality competition.”238 Years 
later, the same court explained that the federal trademark stat-
ute, the Lanham Act, was meant to be read narrowly to only pro-
tect against “fraud and consumer confusion.”239 It declined to 
find infringement in the case at hand, explaining that “[t]o read 
the Act more broadly invites anticompetitive and irrational mar-
ket behavior.”240 
 
 235. See Becher & Feldman, supra note 228, at 476–81. This is especially 
true when one thinks of all the attention marketers give to color choice and 
other visual cues, selections that contain little valuable information for System 
2 decision making. Id. 
 236. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 
208 (1942); see also Hat Corp. of Am. v. D.L. Davis Corp., 4 F. Supp. 613, 623 
(D. Conn. 1933) (noting the “delicate factors” like “stress of voice, emphasis, and 
arrangement of type” calibrated by advertisers for maximum emotional impact). 
 237. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill 
in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 590 (2006). 
 238. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 239. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Cal., 694 F.2d 1150, 
1153 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 240. Id. 
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Generally speaking, however, trademark law has eschewed 
explicit consideration of the emotional impact of particular ad-
vertising strategies.241 The likelihood of confusion factors employ 
various inputs—like mark similarity and relatedness of the 
plaintiff ’s and defendant’s product areas—to assess a con-
sumer’s rational perception of the source of the defendant’s prod-
uct.242 To the extent these factors could also be used to assess 
more emotional aspects of consumer decision making, the courts 
have declined the invitation. For example, of all the likelihood of 
confusion factors, purchaser sophistication seems most suited to 
diagnosing when System 1 reasoning about commercial stimuli 
might be at play. The sophistication factor invites judicial as-
sessments of a trademark’s and shopping milieu’s power to over-
ride deliberative faculties.243 Nevertheless, a comprehensive 
study revealed that a large percentage of infringement cases 
failed to address the factor at all.244 Instead, there is a general 
judicial reluctance to designate any kind of relevant consumer 
group as particularly sophisticated, i.e., less susceptible to ad-
vertisers’ emotional arts.245  
Trademark law’s historical reluctance to interrogate the 
System 1 thought processes of consumers may stem from pru-
dential concerns. System 2 influences are easier to detect than 
influences on System 1 thinking since the latter act largely be-
low the surface of conscious awareness. For example, the diffi-
culty of demonstrating an “association” between the plaintiff ’s 
and defendant’s marks necessary to make a case for dilution has 
limited the availability of that cause of action. Proof of this kind 
of spontaneous, unthinking mental process in consumers’ heads 
 
 241. See Irina D. Manta, Branded, 69 SMU L. REV. 713, 734–35 (2016) (crit-
icizing the law’s failure to reflect the emotional components of successful brand-
ing). 
 242. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing the likelihood of 
confusion factors). 
 243. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 259 (2d Cir. 
1982) (positing, under the purchaser sophistication factor, that “the bustling, 
self-service atmosphere of a typical supermarket makes careful examination of 
products unlikely”). 
 244. Beebe, Empirical Study, supra note 134, at 1642. 
 245. See, e.g., Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 
1016 (7th Cir. 2005) (declining to recognize lower level of purchaser sophistica-
tion for the slightly intoxicated bar patrons that typically play the defendant’s 
video games). Judges tempted to put much weight on the purchaser sophistica-
tion factor have been openly chastised. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consor-
zio Del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 465 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
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has been hard to come by.246 By contrast, survey evidence of con-
fusion seems to focus on System 2 cognition, assessing whether 
consumers deliberating over an advertising stimulus will mis-
take it for the plaintiff ’s trademark.247 As challenging as it is to 
get an accurate read of elements of conscious consumer percep-
tion (like the perceived similarity between two marks), evidence 
of unconscious consumer responses to trademarks has been even 
harder to obtain. As a result, trademark law’s efforts to channel 
consumer perception have historically focused on cognitive ra-
ther than emotional decision making.  
Emotion is beginning to play a larger role in trademark law, 
however. As described below, relatively recent changes to the 
law make consumers’ emotional responses to advertising a focal 
point when assessing liability. These changes offer opportunity 
for consumer neuroscientists promising more information on 
consumers’ emotional responses to advertising stimuli. Re-
searchers studying consumer emotion claim to be able to avoid 
the problem of suggestive survey questions by simply “reading 
out” the brand personality traits that “exist in the mind of the 
consumer a priori.”248 These readings of brand personality, or 
what I have described as neuromarks, promise measurement of 
consumers’ emotional understanding and engagement with 
brands. If you believe the neuroscientists, the evidentiary barri-
ers that caused courts to avoid consideration of shoppers’ System 
1 reasoning in the past will soon be overcome. 
2. Moving Towards Emotion 
More recent initiatives in trademark law are geared to as-
sessing and regulating the emotional System 1 decisions made 
by consumers. Unlike an action for trademark infringement, an 
action for trademark dilution does not require proof that con-
sumers will mistake the defendant’s mark for the plaintiff ’s, 
making an incorrect assumption as they rationally evaluate 
whether or not to buy the defendant’s product. Instead, dilution 
law stops unauthorized uses of famous trademarks that some-
how dim the signaling power of the famous trademark on a non-
cognitive, subconscious, emotional level.249 A successful dilution 
 
 246. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Bradford, supra note 220, at 1274 n.230. 
 248. Chen et al., supra note 18, at 455. 
 249. Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 129–30 (2010); 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1483, 1508 (2013). 
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by tarnishment claim rests on the notion that consumers irra-
tionally lower their estimation of the plaintiff ’s famous trade-
mark when they see the defendant use that mark in a different, 
non-confusing context.250 An instinctual downgrading of the 
Rolls-Royce automotive brand after seeing another actor use 
that brand in a non-confusing but sexualized context is System 
1 reasoning, not System 2 deliberation.251 Until the arrival of the 
dilution cause of action, courts rarely countenanced this kind of 
emotional reasoning on the part of consumers. 
Courts have also recognized a doctrine of “post-sale” confu-
sion that occurs not at the moment of purchase, but when on-
lookers see a purchaser brandishing a trademarked item and 
wrongly associate the item with the plaintiff ’s mark.252 At first 
glance, the theory behind post-sale confusion might seem to con-
cern itself only with consumers’ System 2 deliberations. One jus-
tification for policing post-sale confusion is to protect down-
stream purchasers making their own decisions about products. 
The initial purchasers of a counterfeit Rolex watch may know 
exactly what they are getting given the low cost and circum-
stances of the watch’s purchase. But onlookers seeing the coun-
terfeit may not. They may wrongly attribute any defects in prod-
uct quality to the actual trademark owner instead of the 
counterfeiter. Under this rationale, the doctrine of post-sale con-
fusion helps prevent misleading information from polluting the 
rational decision making of potential future purchasers. 
Yet the evidence of such misleading information influencing 
downstream purchasing decisions is often quite thin. The narra-
tive of the confused onlooker is plausible, but it may be just as 
likely that onlookers recognize the counterfeit good for what it is 
and experience no confusion as to source. If a frugal friend sud-
denly starts sporting a Rolex watch, we will likely doubt its prov-
enance. 
Perhaps recognizing this evidentiary deficit, courts often ar-
ticulate an alternative justification for post-sale confusion that 
 
 250. See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 203, at 106. 
 251. In Rolls-Royce, the court based its decision that a rapper’s stage name 
tarnished the luxury car brand, in part, on the rapper’s use of song titles like 
“Hoe in You” and an advertisement featuring “a scantily-clad woman.” Rolls-
Royce Motor Cars Ltd. v. Davis, No. 15-0417 (KM), 2016 WL 3913640, at *8 
(D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2016). 
 252. E.g., Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). For an exhaustive analysis and critique of the post-sale confu-
sion doctrine, see generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 
769 (2012). 
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has little to do with consumer confusion as to source at all. In-
stead, courts assert the doctrine’s necessity as a means to regu-
late consumers’ emotional attitudes towards a brand. According 
to some, the doctrine of post-sale confusion is really a pretext for 
a larger concern with preserving the ability of luxury goods to 
signal status.253 Judges openly reason that past purchasers of 
the trademark owners’ branded goods will suffer if they witness 
others displaying the same mark on unauthorized products.254  
For example, in one case involving the sale of kit cars that 
resembled Ferraris, the court observed:  
If the country is populated with hundreds, if not thousands, of replicas 
of rare, distinct, and unique vintage cars, obviously they are no longer 
distinct, and they are no longer unique. Even if a person seeing one of 
these replicas driving down the road is not confused, Ferrari’s exclusive 
association with this design has been diluted and eroded.255  
Note that this description of post-sale confusion really describes 
a harm to the emotional power of the Ferrari brand built up 
through advertising. The Ferrari name signals status and pres-
tige, but these emotional valences come under threat when Fer-
rari luxury suddenly seems accessible to a larger swath of the 
population. Actual Ferrari cars mechanically perform just as 
well as they ever did, but consumers’ emotional response to the 
Ferrari brand changes if it no longer indicates exclusivity. Under 
this rationale, courts recognize post-sale confusion to preserve 
the emotional snob appeal of the mark, not to prevent buyers 
from making rational decisions under false pretenses.256 Like di-
 
 253. Mark P. McKenna, Probabilistic Knowledge of Third-Party Trademark 
Infringement, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10, 12 (2011); Sheff, supra note 252, at 
790–94. 
 254. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 
358 (6th Cir. 2006); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Pro-
motions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Katya Assaf, Buying 
Goods and Doing Good: Trademarks and Social Competition, 67 ALA. L. REV. 
979, 1005–06 (2016) (“Another oft-mentioned justification for the post-sale con-
fusion doctrine points out that the value of the original trademark, which de-
rives in part from its scarcity, is likely to be diminished by widespread counter-
feits.”). 
 255. Ferrari S.p.A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse v. McBurnie, 11 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1843, 1848 (S.D. Cal. 1989). 
 256. See, e.g., Hermes Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 
108 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing differences between point-of-sale confusion and 
post-sale confusion). This is not to say that a concern with maintaining one’s 
status through the conspicuous display of certain material goods is completely 
irrational. But such a concern is more likely to be fueled by emotional consider-
ations when compared to other criteria for purchase like product performance 
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lution law, post-sale confusion is geared less to consumers’ ra-
tional consideration of product information and more to protect-
ing the investment made by famous brand holders in acquiring 
emotional mindshare.  
The arrival of the neuromark may offer legally-cognizable 
evidence of how the buying public emotionally responds to dif-
ferent trademarks. A change in a trademark’s neural signature 
after consumers are exposed to a flood of knock-off products 
might be offered to illustrate the harms of post-sale confusion. 
Tarnishment claims could be bolstered by showing how various 
indices in a mark’s neural map (e.g., its reputation for rugged-
ness) decline once consumers have been exposed to the defend-
ant’s mark. Even though inquiries into System 1 reasoning have 
traditionally been disdained or avoided by trademark courts, 
this may change as such reasoning suddenly appears susceptible 
to measurement, not judicial guesswork. With neuromarks, the 
practical barriers that once restrained courts from exploring the 
emotional aspects of consumer decision making may no longer 
seem to be an issue.  
3. Privileging Deliberation Over Emotion 
A move to legally recognize consumers’ emotional reactions 
towards brands is not necessarily in consumers’ best interests. 
Recognizing evidence of emotional value in a trademark is likely 
to privilege that value.257 This Article maintains that, in deter-
mining how neuroscientific insights should be incorporated into 
trademark law, courts should try to limit themselves to consid-
eration of consumers’ cognitive, deliberative judgments, not 
their emotional, instinctual ones. At the very least, courts should 
exercise an abundance of caution as businesses clamor to intro-
duce neural information of consumer emotional state. 
It would be fair to ask why trademark law should limit itself 
to only one side of consumers’ dual reasoning system, particu-
larly when laboratory discoveries are shedding new light on the 
role of emotions in human decision making. More accurate un-
derstanding of consumer perception represents a longstanding 
 
and reliability. Moreover, consumption based on the desire for status is corre-
lated with lower life satisfaction, perhaps testifying to the irrational nature of 
some status-related consumer decision making. See TIM KASSER, THE HIGH 
PRICE OF MATERIALISM 5–22 (2002).  
 257. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as 
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990) (de-
scribing emergence of the “if value, then right” rationale in trademark law). 
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goal for judges deciding trademark cases. Discounting neural ev-
idence of automatic, emotional reasoning would seem to ignore 
that goal just as it begins to come within reach.258 Nevertheless, 
there are at least three good reasons for limiting trademark law’s 
ambit to the cognitive side of consumer decision making. 
First, even as neuroscience offers evidence of emotional re-
sponse, it should be kept in mind that emotions represent com-
plex mental processes that are not yet fully understood by re-
searchers. Neuroscientists are on safer ground when they map 
the neural indices of familiarity with a brand, evidence directly 
relevant to trademark law’s acquired distinctiveness analysis. 
Trying to pinpoint the emotional response necessary to prove 
harm to a trademark’s reputation requires consideration of 
many more variables. Given this complexity, allowing neurosci-
entific evidence of consumer emotion to decide trademark dilu-
tion cases could lead to anti-competitive outcomes.  
For example, I may be familiar with the BEN & JERRY’S 
mark for ice cream and this familiarity may even be revealed 
through fMRI readings thereby supplying evidence correlated 
with acquired distinctiveness. But arguing that I have a partic-
ular positive emotional reaction to the Ben & Jerry’s trademark 
that will be eroded by a non-confusing use of “Ben & Jerry’s” on 
another product requires disentangling my general love of ice 
cream with my specific feelings towards the Ben & Jerry’s brand. 
The concern is treating neural evidence of an emotional reaction 
 
 258. In addition, scientists are still probing the truth of the split between 
emotional and cognitive thinking. Some psychological studies challenge the 
dual processing model favored by Kahneman and others, and even Kahneman 
admits to some overlap between System 1 and System 2. KAHNEMAN, supra note 
224, at 86 (“System 1 is expected to influence even the more careful decisions. 
Its input never ceases.”). Yet some neuroscientists point to imaging results that 
they say affirm the presence of two different systems of consumer decision-mak-
ing—one evaluative and goal-directed, the other automatic and habit-based. See 
George I. Christopoulos et al., Toward an Understanding of Dynamic Moral De-
cision Making: Model-Free and Model-Based Learning, 144 J. BUS. ETHICS 699, 
703 (2017) (discussing habitual and goal-directed learning strategies); John P. 
O’Doherty et al., Learning, Reward, and Decision Making, 68 ANN. REV. PSY-
CHOL. 73 (2017) (same); Antonio Rangel et al., A Framework for Studying the 
Neurobiology of Value-Based Decision Making, 9 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCI-
ENCE 545, 547–48 (2008) (same). My suggestion that trademark courts limit 
themselves to investigating System 2 reasoning does not depend on the empiri-
cal truth of the dual processing model, however, or the complete separation of 
one processing track from another. Even if these decision-making processes are 
not neurally discrete and consumers employ both System 1 and System 2 rea-
soning when making most or even all purchasing decisions, there are normative 
reasons for courts to be more receptive to evidence of System 2 reasoning in the 
trademark law context. 
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to a product as proof of an emotional attachment to a single 
trademark. More broadly, there is a danger in being overly per-
suaded by fMRI images that supposedly reveal the neural archi-
tecture of a complex, ill-defined emotional state like tarnish-
ment. As a prominent critic of brain imaging research notes, 
neuroscientific examinations of concepts (whether psychological 
or legal) that are vague and unspecified naturally produce unre-
liable results.259  
In concept, the neuromark suggests a future where a brand’s 
emotional signature can be teased apart from the product it is 
attached to. But it may take a long time for neuroscience to get 
there, if ever. Courts should be reluctant to recognize neurosci-
entific evidence of the psychological pull of a brand on the public 
that overlaps to any degree with the emotional hold of the prod-
uct being sold under that brand. Because dilution law does not 
require that speech be misleading, it endangers a whole range of 
valuable expression in a way that infringement law does not.260 
The danger of stifling this expression looms even larger if courts 
entertain neuroscientific evidence of trademark dilution that re-
ally reflects harm to entire product categories instead of partic-
ular trademarks. 
Second, there are benefits to defining trademark law so as 
to prompt consumers to use their deliberative faculties instead 
of their automatic, instinctual ones. As Fred Yen has posited, 
trademark doctrines that allow some amount of confusion to ex-
ist actually benefit consumers by encouraging them to develop 
greater brand literacy and awareness.261 Consumers that expe-
rience confusion become better at distinguishing between trade-
marks; those lacking this experience fail to recognize important 
distinctions.262 According to Yen, although many of our shopping 
decisions rely on the automaticity of System 1, we need moments 
of confusion to slow the process down and engage System 2 to 
 
 259. UTTAL, supra note 161, at 21–22. 
 260. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks 
and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 
80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 926–27 (2005). 
 261. Alfred C. Yen, The Constructive Role of Confusion in Trademark, 93 
N.C. L. REV. 77, 125 (2014). 
 262. Id.; see also Barton Beebe & C. Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong 
Marks: Should Trademark Law Protect the Strong More Than the Weak?, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1395 (2017) (positing that if competitors are allowed to 
“snuggle” near very strong marks, consumers may suffer some initial confusion 
but will quickly learn to adapt and no longer be confused). 
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create new strategies for decoding advertising stimuli.263 Even-
tually, these new strategies may become so routine as to be au-
tomated and used by System 1 but we need System 2 reasoning 
to create them in the first place.264 “At the very least,” Yen says, 
“modest confusion concerning trademarks actually helps con-
sumers avoid confusion by helping them develop valuable cogni-
tive skills that make distinguishing and understanding trade-
marks possible.”265  
Just as an overly broad view of consumer confusion threat-
ens the development of these cognitive skills, an embrace of neu-
roscientific evidence of emotional response to trademarks could 
jeopardize consumers’ ability to learn from and avoid advertis-
ing’s emotional traps. Businesses spend an enormous amount of 
resources trying to convince us of a trademark’s particular emo-
tional meaning. Some attack this entire process as economically 
wasteful, with the money spent on persuasive (as opposed to in-
formational) advertising better spent on the research needed to 
make functionally better products.266 But one doesn’t have to be 
such an advertising skeptic to recognize that consumers need to 
develop the ability to comprehend and resist some of the emo-
tional appeals engineered by advertisers. Just taking Apple’s 
word for it that it “thinks differently” than other technology com-
panies or uncritically accepting Ford’s suggestion that its trucks 
are “Built Ford Tough” would lead to suboptimal choices in the 
marketplace. Laws like dilution that limit challenges to these 
emotional messages give consumers less practice in deciphering 
and resisting advertising’s System 1 appeals. The consumer’s af-
fective response to the ROLLS ROYCE mark becomes less dis-
cerning if she never had the opportunity to be exposed to Rolls 
Royce Rizzy’s slightly alternative take. Using neuroscientific ev-
idence of changes to a mark’s emotional meaning to prohibit al-
ternative brand messages would hamper consumers’ ability to 
develop greater literacy with the emotional language of modern 
advertising.  
Finally, although my focus here has been on courts’ use of 
neuroscientific evidence and not advertisers’ applied use of neu-
roscientific insights, the two are related. Trademark law re-
wards some advertising strategies while penalizing others. Even 
 
 263. Yen, supra note 261, at 125. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 125–26. 
 266. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal 
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1948). 
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if neural imaging promises a way to more accurately predict con-
sumer perception, and thereby makes it easier to detect con-
sumer confusion and mark dilution, judges should address the 
difficult underlying question of which advertising strategies 
trademark law should be in the business of promoting and which 
ones it should undermine, or at least not reinforce, in further-
ance of consumer welfare.267 Decisions about the admissibility 
and effect of consumer neuroscience evidence require courts to 
decide whether they should passively ratify advertising strate-
gies that leverage the automatic, emotional side of human rea-
soning or more actively question the net social benefit of legal 
protection for such strategies. 
For most of its history, trademark law has reacted passively 
to changing marketing methods instead of proactively shaping 
the ways in which consumers shop and producers sell. For exam-
ple, the likelihood of confusion analysis adjusted to new forms of 
brand merchandizing (think John Deere key chains and t-shirts) 
by simply enlarging the sphere of potential confusion without re-
ally interrogating whether such merchandizing should be part of 
trademark law’s remit. It is by no means clear that trademark 
holders should have exclusive rights over the sale of products 
that use marks primarily for their ornamental value, rather 
than as indicators of source. Nevertheless, a series of trademark 
infringement decisions quickly ratified the right to use trade-
marks to merchandize.268  
A historical counterexample offers a useful reference point 
for courts evaluating the proper role of consumer neuroscience 
evidence for trademark law. According to its originator, dilution 
law was designed to safeguard the “psychological hold” that suc-
cessful advertising had on the public.269 Courts were hesitant to 
enforce laws that provided businesses this power, which they 
considered a radical expansion.270 Even though the whole point 
of these new causes of action was to arm mark holders with a 
 
 267. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UN-
FAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 24 (4th ed. 2014) (discussing the debate 
over whether trademark law should be reactive or proactive towards new ad-
vertising techniques). 
 268. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: 
Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 463 (2005) (summarizing 
the history of merchandizing trademarks).  
 269. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 
HARV. L. REV. 813, 831 (1927). 
 270. Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 731, 763 (2003). 
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way to stop non-confusing unauthorized uses of their marks, 
judges decided to require confusion for a successful dilution ac-
tion. Other courts required proof of actual dilution, evidence that 
was extremely hard to come by and not required by the statutory 
language. Part of this judicial resistance stemmed from a belief 
that dilution threatened a sort of mind control, with the law pre-
venting consumers from shaking their initial impression of a fa-
mous mark.271 Out of antipathy to the very conception of dilu-
tion, courts made dilution impossible to prove. 
The initial period of judicial intransigence to dilution law is 
instructive.272 Resistance to dilution law came in the context of 
a larger social and legal backlash against advertising techniques 
that relied on subliminal messaging and psychoanalysis to influ-
ence consumers. Federal officials and agencies and quasi-public 
regulators all reacted to put limits on some of these techniques 
because they appeared to violate an accepted vision of human 
autonomy.273 Somewhat similarly, judges saw a stark difference 
between the traditional role of trademark law in regulating the 
deliberative, cognitive choices of consumers and its newer role in 
shaping their unconscious, emotional reasoning.274 This fault 
line will be relevant again as courts confront neuroscientific evi-
dence of a mark’s unique emotional signature in consumers’ 
minds.275  
 
 271. BARTHOLOMEW, supra note 95, at 91–122. 
 272. Over time, trademark holders overcame the initial judicial resistance 
to dilution law. In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “actual dilution” 
needed to be proven for a successful dilution claim. Moseley v. V Secret Cata-
logue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003). Concerned that a requirement that plain-
tiffs prove actual dilution would effectively eviscerate the dilution cause of ac-
tion, Congress quickly moved to pass a new law affirming that only a “likelihood 
of dilution” was required for a successful dilution claim, and courts had little 
choice but to acquiesce. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109–312, 120 Stat. 1730.  
 273. BARTHOLOMEW, supra note 95, at 112–16. It turns out that these mar-
keting strategies were more hype than reality, but the more important lesson 
from this historical period was that lawmakers saw their role as setting limits 
on a new form of advertising. Id.  
 274. Some of the opposition to dilution law may have also come from related 
concerns over competition. Dilution law threatens to place other businesses at 
a disadvantage by restricting their ability to use certain terms, even when there 
is no risk of confusion. Beverly M. Pattishall, The Case for Anti-Dilution Trade-
Mark Statutes, 43 TRADEMARK REP. 887, 888 (1953) (contending that courts 
avoided granting relief in early trademark dilution cases out of fear of encour-
aging monopolistic and anti-competitive behavior).  
 275. One might argue that if trademark law should not facilitate consumers’ 
System 1 reasoning, then dilution law should be abandoned as a whole. At this 
point, however, dilution law does not seem to be going away. Any legal changes 
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  CONCLUSION   
Criminal law has received the lion’s share of attention, but, 
in some ways, trademark law represents the legal arena most 
likely to respond to advances in brain science. Judicial guesses 
as to consumer perception determine the most important aspects 
of trademark law. If consumer neuroscience promises a better 
understanding of the consumer’s brain, then that understanding 
would seem to improve the accuracy of judicial decision-making 
in this particular legal terrain. Already, courts routinely accept 
outside surveys of potential consumers to assess distinctiveness 
and likelihood of confusion. One does not have to be a science 
fiction fan to envision a future where neural imaging replaces 
judicial intuition in determining the outcomes of trademark dis-
putes. 
The history of law and psychology indicates, however, that 
calls for sudden changes in how trademark cases are decided will 
not be welcome. Instead, consumer neuroscience evidence will 
slowly work its way into specific pockets of trademark law, weak-
ening some tests based on judicial intuition while gradually 
strengthening the claims of trademark holders. Some of these 
alterations will be beneficial. But others will simply result in 
more control by trademark holders with little thought to con-
sumers’ interests apart from shopping efficiency. Consumer neu-
roscientists contend that machines can measure the effects of 
advertising on our minds at an incredibly fine-grained level. Per-
haps the reliability of these measurements has been overstated, 
particularly when it comes to decoding some of the complex men-
tal processes at issue in trademark law. Even more importantly, 
by itself, measurement of consumer perception does not reveal 
how that measurement should be accounted for in the law. Ulti-
mately, it is up to judges and lawmakers to decide if the psycho-
logical hold captivating trademarks have over us deserves legal 
protection. The answer will not come from records of blood flow 
and electrical activity in consumers’ brains.  
 
 
prompted by consumer neuroscience are unlikely to include the abandonment 
of an entire cause of action. See supra Part II.B. 
